Okay. This is interview with Fred Faust, February 13th, 2003. And we’re here at Gateway II. And Fred first a little bit of background information, where and when were you born?

I was born August 23rd, 1950 in the New York City area, and I grew up there until I went to college in Boston in 1968 at Emerson College.

Okay. And what did you, what did you take up at Emerson?

I majored in communications.

Okay. And you graduated from Emerson in? (F: ’72) And what did you do right after that?

I came up to the city of Lowell, Massachusetts and worked in news at WCAP.

And when you first came to Lowell how would, how would you describe the social and economic condition of the city during that period?

Well I was somebody who grew up in the suburbs of New York City, and then spent time in Boston in college for four years. So Lowell was very different for me. Um, you know on the bad side obviously it had a huge tip on its shoulder in terms of you know, the economic status of the area. And people seeing the whole history of the mills, and the deterioration of the economy, and the loss of textile industry as they took that in a very you know, personal way. People felt slighted. People, you know when you would ask...
people about Lowell and what the serious issues were, the first thing in everybody’s mind was unemployment. And the areas I had been from, well I grew up in New Rochelle, which was, there were certainly affluent sections, it was working class too, but not to the extent of what was in Lowell. So I’d never really been in a real working city before, and one that sort of considered itself you know, a little bit down and out. When I was working at the radio station one of the stories I was assigned to cover one night was a meeting at the Smith Baker Center with Pat Mogan, and a professor from the University of Pittsburgh, and Brad Morse who was a Congressman at the time. And that was the first time I heard about the National Park concept. (A: Okay) Hadn’t known anything about Lowell’s history. Didn’t know what these big red brick buildings were, or why there were you know, canals running along and perpendicular to the streets. And all of a sudden everything sort of made sense to me. And as somebody who was sort of interested in planning and urban ideas, and so forth, it just really made some connections, and I just thought it was a very neat idea.

[There’s a knock at the door. Tape is turned off, then on again]

A: Fred, tell us about radio when you first came to the city. What were you doing? You were the news director, or reporter?

F: Just started as a reporter. (A: Okay) I had just graduated from college. At that point, in 1972, the Rialto was a bowling alley. (A: Yah) And I basically, again I was interested in history and politics, and urban areas. So I was sort of, quickly had to find my bearings in a very complex political climate like Lowell, which you’re forced to do right away, because everybody is calling you on the phone, the city councilors, the school committee people, you know, wanting to make sure they get the best kind of coverage. So one of the things you had to do is sort out the players and the interest groups. I remember being completely amazed going to the city council meetings, and the school committee, because so much, so much a part of the meeting was rhetoric. It seemed like somebody could speak for an hour and a half on you know, on a pothole. Some things never change. And everything was politics, but for somebody who was reporting it was sort of a fascinating kind of learning experience. And so, and I think it was a reasonably fast study and saw the lay of the land, and met a lot of interesting people and started to become familiar, more familiar with the community.

A: What were some of the political alliances from those days?

F: Well a lot of that sort of generated from the mayoral races. Who was in and who was out. I remember when I was around, at that point Ellen Sampson was the Mayor. (A: Okay) There weren’t too many women Mayors. She was sort of a character, or maybe a caricature in and of herself. There were, I think in Lowell at that time there were sort of the you know, the young, newer, reform types. The Paul Tsongas, the Dick Howes at that point. They had just come off replacing Charlie Gallagher as the City Manager. Paul Tsongas would be leaving the council shortly thereafter to run for Middlesex County Commission on a [form] slate. And then there were the Sam Pollards, the Ray Rourkeys, the more traditional politicians who really, you know, their work was sort of based on
more old alliances and constituent services and so forth. And at the same time there were
starting to be, thanks to Pat Mogan and the Model Cities folks, and very different kind of
ideas for redeveloping Lowell and for focusing pride on the history of the city, which
again at that time was just, just about completely covered up. So there was sort of the old
group and the new group. The old group also consisted of a lot of downtown business
people who just sort of had hung around, weren’t really making much money, were
basically complaining about everything. You couldn’t get anybody to agree on anything
at all. There were a substantial number of buildings in tax title in those days. I believe
Paul Sheehy at that time was the City Manager. And it was just hard to get any
momentum going, or to overcome the psychology of failure.

A: Okay. What were some of the issues that were happening around town during that
time?

F: Well there were different ideas of how to bring Lowell back. You know there was
everything from monorails to urban cultural parks, to taking down the downtown, putting
up new buildings. And Lowell wasn’t very demanding when it came to development,
which was scary because of some of the existing buildings that were here, and the
potential loss of integrity. I came in I guess just after Merrimack Manufacturing was
taken down, and the boarding houses on Dutton Street were taken down. And that clearly
evoked some concern in the community. I remember walking by and watching for a
while as they took the [flat iron] building down where the Central Bank is today, and
thinking what a shame, you know, that’s such an attractive building. And certainly at that
point I was not into historic preservation, but it was just an attractive building, and it
seemed a waste to be doing that. There didn’t seem to be particularly coherent plan. The
urban renewal at that point was urban renewal. It was handled by the Development
Authority, which again had a lot of sort of older established industrial, industrially
oriented members. And one of the things that started to happen in Lowell and I believe
under Paul Sheehy was that Frank Keefe was hired as the Director of Planning and
Development. And Frank, I remember asking Frank you know, “What’s a planner do?”
And he said, “A planner is a clear thinker.” And Frank well defined that. He had great
grasp of all kinds of ideas, projects, complex projects, and you know, he, Pat Mogan,
Brad Morse succeeded by Paul Cronin, and certainly Paul Tsongas sort of defined the
you know, new ambitions for the, for the community. And each played a role in a very
different way of trying to get the community to a critical [mass] to accept some new ideas
and to you know, grasp what the real potential of an Urban Cultural Park, and then a
State Heritage Park, and a National Park were all about, and get past this you know,
terrible image that everybody had in the back of their minds was ghost town, mill town,
highest unemployment rate in the state, etc. etc.

A: Okay, other issues around town. How about the battle for and against the Connector
Extension?

F: That was before my time. (A: Okay) I remember the, some of the battles for you
know, a little bit later for really for historic preservation, non historic preservation. I
remember a nursing home that was proposed for the old Rex amusement area, (A: Okay)
which would have been something that could have been located in Chelmsford, Tewksbury, Tyngsboro, anything else. It was you know, fairly horrific design. And everybody was jumping up and down for joy at the thought that someone will actually spend money to put something new in downtown Lowell. So again that tells you something about the mentality. I remember the fight on the Housing Authority, which Armand Mercier was very involved in, and a couple of the other members on the reuse of the mill on, along the Pawtucket Canal, losing the (--)

A: Okay. John Pilling Mill?

F: The Pilling Mill, and that came one vote away from basically becoming a new high rise, and that building not being preserved.

A: Oh really.

F: And I remember holding one of our first Preservation Commission [unclear], but one of our first meetings there and everything was you know, old people don’t want to be warehoused, old people don’t want to be in a place where they had so many negative memories. And I remember the first time, in fact I think Governor Dukakis attended the meeting, and one of the old gentleman stood up and told us how he had worked in that building. And you know, my cart with the spindles was here. And I remember you know, Joe something or other from here, and now I live like a hundred feet away, and isn’t that the most wonderful thing in the world. And just to look at the quality of that building and the setting, and know you could never you know, short of spending a thousand dollars a square foot, come up with anything that had a similar quality of life, or character. So it was pretty dramatic in those early days. Now we sort of get used to oh yah, another building is being done. But there was a struggle just to get anything done.

A: Let me ask you about some personalities around town back then. You already mentioned Dick Howe. Describe your, you know, your dealings with him, your opinions, your story about him?

F: Well Dick was actually Paul Tsongas’ law partner, with Sidney Rindler. They were partners together in the Fairburn Building. I think their sign is still on the window. Three very different personalities, but three people with a high amount of integrity and the desire to, for public service. I mean Dick was always a fighter right from the beginning. And he and Paul Tsongas and a couple of the other members banded together again to change the City Manager. They felt that the City Manager was not forward thinking, and that it was all local politics and they were responsible for pushing Charlie Gallagher out and bringing in Jim Sullivan, who whether you like him or not certainly had a huge mark. I mean it probably, if you think back to a more modern era of management, management techniques, pushing an agenda, pushing the city along, Jim Sullivan working with the business community, Jim Sullivan did all of those things and he brought in some talented people to the city. So I mean I didn’t really have that much contact with Dick, but I certainly respected his ethics and his willingness to put himself out there. He had run against Joe Tully, who was the state senator at the time. I’m sure
that was disappointing for Dick, because I think he was beaten like three to one or something. (A: Yah) Joe Tully was certainly a powerhouse and a, you know, politician in the sense of knowing everybody, and everybody knowing him. So I’m sure in hindsight Dick didn’t have that much of a chance. But two strong people, two good size egos, and it’s amazing how even for the smallest offenses somebody can like you, or dislike you for life. And I guess there must have been larger offenses there, because a lot of those kinds of fault lines still run down the political environment today.

A: Yah. Now Joe Tully being one of kind of having his own click on the political scene during that early to mid 70s era?

F: Well I’m trying to remember what year Joe Tully became City Manager.

A: Not until ’79.

F: Okay. So Joe was sort of the state senator was there. The delegation at that point, there were a lot of jealousies, because I remember somebody saying, you know, “Joe is mad at Paul Tsongas, because Paul gets all this credit for everything. Well who really go the high S bridge issue resolved?” I mean, and I’m thinking, what are they talking about? You know, so there really was a disconnect in a lot of ways. The delegation was there doing the local stuff, and making sure that the bread and butter issues were covered. But that was very much disconnected in a lot of ways from what was going on in the downtown revitalization, urban park and so forth. And in all due respect, because Joe Tully certainly caught up when it made sense to do it, but I think that that delegation again just looked completely to other issues and was very disconnected from the renewal issues. When the State Heritage Park concept started to come up and so forth, you know, ultimately those folks signed on and they were able to encourage some of that. But I mean I think that Frank Sargent, the Governor, Mike Dukakis and some of the Pat Morgans and some of the city officials really, Armand Lemay, were much stronger leaders in those areas than the delegation. I think for a long time there was a disconnect with that delegation, and yes those were strong personalities, strong political affiliations, and again, I know since I was, would later become a Tsongas guy, that you know, some of those alliances were sort of hard to come by. Paul Tsongas did a great job of bridging those things. When you talk about a Joe Tully, you know, people did think of him as well, you know, he was just prototypical, politician State Senator, back slapper, get you friend a job. I mean he was on the committee in the counties, and that was his whole thing. How many jobs could he get, because for every job he could get he’d get x number of votes. (A: Yah) But Joe Tully really was, had a lot more depth and intelligence to him than that, which became clear when he and Paul Tsongas started working together.

A: Hm, okay. Interesting. How about Bobby Kennedy? What was his relationship with Paul back then?

F: Well Bob was sort of a loner in a lot of ways, and a maverick in some ways. (A: Uh huh) Bob was not always somebody who everyone else counted on to make the vote that
he was expected to make. And so people were sometimes dubious about directions Bob was going in. Um, and I think that you know, we all mature in time. If you look at the job that Bob has done at the Regional Transit Authority, and the ways he’s directed his energy, you know, he’s won wide support. In those days I think a lot of people weren’t sure what to make of Bob. Also the extent of political range wars, we’re talking about Joe Tully and Dick Howe, the next thing you have to talk about is Bobby Kennedy, Bob Kennedy and Phil Shea. They served on the council together. They ran against each other for State Representative. It was a bruising sort of battle, close race. I think there was a recount involved at one point, and again, political fault lines. You know, those were people, probably the closest they would ever get was one might be in the meat section and one might be in the frozen food section in DeMoulas. And if they got any closer you’d want to move out of the way. Bob really has had a lot of different incarnations. You know when Bob was the Mayor we had housing. I’m sorry, busing, the busing issues going on. We had some difficult issues. Bob played a really important role in those days. Much to you know, and took a lot of shots and had a lot of political liability. Did the same thing working with Chet Atkins, but I think I’m you know, very much convinced he was doing it for the right reasons. So I, you know, I think Bob, Bob’s has an interesting political history. Somebody who really started out I think as very political, and was seen as very changeable in terms of what he was supporting and how did it benefit Bob Kennedy, but really matured I think from the days as Mayor. Bob was a very strong supporter, a cheerleader really for the National Park and the State Heritage Park. He was very much tireless, and you know, he and Armand Lemay as Mayors probably were the two strongest supporters, and most influential supporters of that whole effort.

A: Hm, okay.

F: Those are the people who bought in right away.

A: Okay. You’ve already talked about Phil Shea a little bit. How about some of the old timers like Sam Pollard?

F: Well I didn’t have that much exposure to Sam. When I started covering the city council he was there. And Sam was interesting because he really was one of the sweetest people you could ever meet. You now he would, if you met him on a social kind of situation, he would sit down and he would talk to you about his life and he’d ask you how you were doing. And he was just sort of so easy going. When he got into the council meetings he had a harangue or a cause to talk about. And he could talk a long time. I have to say in all deference to those that are not with us anymore, but there were a couple of people who talked so long, I’m not the most patient person, and I just couldn’t believe that some of these folks could just talk about you know, for a half an hour on anything and everything, and multiple times every night. So you got to a situation at the city council meetings where you had nine councilors, and most of them could talk a lot. And those meetings went on until 11:00 or 12:00 it seemed like every Tuesday, because people just talked and talked and talked. I have to say I very distinctly remember Sam Pollard, he always seemed to be standing up when he spoke to address the council, and he
did it in a very sort of ceremonial manner, almost as if there must have been a thousand people in the audience, and he, he liked to carry on.

A: Did he come from a more formal time of politic, political oratory, or something?

F: Definitely I would say that. That would be on the mark. Yah.

A: Um, how about George O’Meara?

F: I know that George O’Meara was on the Development, Redevelopment Authority. He was sort of seen as one of the movers and shakers at that point in terms of development in the business community. He was close to the Kennedys, but I didn’t really have too much contact with George.

A: Okay. And how about Homer Bourgeois?

F: Before my time.

A: Okay. (F: Yah) And Paul didn’t have any political relationship with him?

F: I think Homer’s power really peaked prior to that. He might have been somebody that you have to go to and be deferential towards, but the Union National Bank you know, Paul ran for Congress in ’74, and I think that Homer’s power had really peaked at that, at that point. And again I don’t remember, I don’t remember Paul ever meeting with him, or really talking about him. The Union National Bank was still sort of a force, but I don’t think at you know that point, in ’74 or ’75 he was any longer a player or a major player.

A: Okay, and any interesting stories about him?

F: Well it would be third hand. So I’m sure people have better stories than I do.

A: What’s one of them that you can recall?

F: It’s more just a sense that he ran the town. (A: Really) That when it came to jobs and borrowing money, and important relationships, Homer had sort of [tenants] everywhere, and that he was sort of the Franco-America Godfather. And so I you know, I guess there are lots of stories about all of the business that went down in the board room over the Union National Bank. It’s hard to imagine that today you’ve got banks, and then independent banks, and but there from what I understand Union National Bank has controlled sort of the money flow in the community. And if you were wired in to Homer then you were going to do pretty well, and be able to buy a house and start a business and so forth, and potentially get a job. And if you weren’t, then maybe not.

A: Okay. Interesting. Um, Paul goes on from the council. Now when you came he was still on the council, or had he (--
F: When I got there in ’72 he had been elected, I think re-elected to the city council. I think he came in 8th.

A: Did that signify anything that he came in almost last?

F: Again, I can’t say that I was you know, there at that precise time. I think that he was shy. He didn’t really sell himself that much. But I don’t know enough about what was going on in terms of the politics, or what he did or didn’t do. I just know basically he survived. Once you get on the council, whether you come in first or ninth, you have the same vote and the same voice. (A: Sure) I knew that my impressions of Paul from meeting and watching the council meetings, hearing about the kinds of things he was talking about, was that he was a reformer. He was shy, but he was outspoken. He had very definite ideas, and he was tireless. And I mean very early on you heard that he wanted to you know, go other places and be, be other things. He took on the reform issues. He had good relationship with the media, Middlesex County News Service at the time. Some of the reporters at the Lowell Sun, unlike Clemie Costello. Nobody liberal had a particularly good relationship with Clemie Costello. (A: Right) The Boston Globe. Paul was somewhat of a fair-haired boy because he was a reformer, and that was an interesting juxtaposition because of the way a lot of people looked at Lowell. And he was able with Lester Ralph and Counihan, they were running for County Commissioner and I believe treasurer at the time. And there was a courthouse scandal where there was a bidding fixed allegedly with the previous County Commissioners, and some friends got to build the county jail, which turned out to be some sort of a monstrosity of a building, went way, way over in cost and there were all kinds of stories about it. So it was a good jumping off point. But funny thing with Paul is that we used to do a Saturday sort of radio column, not dissimilar to the Sunday column that the newspaper still has. (A: Yah) And we would just do some sort of satirical stuff. And one time, one of the little stories I did was to talk about, compare Paul Tsongas to a slinky climbing up and down the stairs. You know these steel, little steel toy contraptions, (A: Umhm) and you put it at the top of the stair and it just sort of slinks down and there’s nothing you can do to stop it, and it goes back up, all right, make it go back up. So I was you know, obviously sort of joking about it and saying it tongue and cheek, that every time you went to a new office it was, you know, it wasn’t even two years before he was going on to the next one, like a slinky. (A: Yah) Um, well in I guess ’74 a couple of people who I work with at the radio station, well actually local people, they were involved in, they were sort of on the reform minded vote in Lowell, and fairly liberal. And you know, they were complaining about people like Clemie Costella and the Lowell Sun, and so forth, and some of the more conventional politics. (A: Yah) And so Paul Tsongas had decided to run for Congress. He had called a meeting with, John Kerry attended, Paul Sheehy, and basically Paul’s thing was we can’t run. Everybody can’t run again. Everybody can’t split up. Somebody has got to try and beat Paul Cronin, and it really should be one party. And Paul in his sort of typical determined way basically said, “I’m running. Who else is running?” Nobody at that point was willing to step forward. And a lot of people didn’t think that they could ever beat Paul Cronin, because once you get into a position like that (--) And Cronin had a reasonable voting record. And there was a tradition in the district actually after Edith Nourse Rogers and Brad Morse, where there hadn’t been a
Democratic Congressman in I think fifty years or something. So now we think of this as a Democratic District, (A: Yah) but it wasn’t that way at that time. So Paul sort of anointed himself to run, and a couple of people he worked with said, they said you know, “Well we need a press secretary.” And they said, “You should talk to Fred Faust.” So he actually sent a couple of people in to the radio station to talk to me. And he said, “All right, you can talk to him, but I don’t really like him. He called me a slinky.” Anyway I met with a couple of people.

A: Who, who were his associates back then?

F: Well the first person who talked to me at the time was somebody by the name of Diane Harris, who was like a local political activist. And then he sent Dennis Cannon, who you know, would later be his administrative assistant and a partner at [unclear] and somebody who, you know, we are very close to today, (A: Yah) in to talk to me. And again, I had sort of inherited that you know, Lowell mentality. “Why is somebody who is not from Lowell talking to me? Who do these people think they are? How do they think they could ever win a Congressional race? I’d never seen this guy before.” And I mean we were all at that point, I was twenty-four years old and this was, he was old. He was like twenty-six or twenty-seven. The guy who did the media with me was, was a similar age. The guy who did the legislative work, none of them were from Lowell.

A: Really?

F: And I just said, “You people are crazy? You really think you could win something? You don’t even come from around here. You don’t even know the area.” The first time we met actually was in, where the Radio Shack is in Central Plaza. It used to be a Friendly’s. (A: Okay) And we sat around a booth, and I stared at these people. And half of them were wearing army fatigue jackets. And I said, “Why am I hear wasting my time?” But they were all sort of veterans of the Drinan race, and some other political campaigns. And you know, they offered me a job as press secretary. They offered me actually less than I was making at WCAP, and if you know anything about the payroll history at WCAP, that’s sort of hard to imagine. So the first time I ever had with Paul Tsongas I said, you know, and I, I had known him, but we weren’t close in any way. And he said, ”So you know, do you want to join the campaign?” I said, “Yah, I’d like to join the campaign.” And we talked a little about, about money, and we talked a little about background. And I said to him, “First of all, you know, you have no chance to win.” And he said, “Oh, okay.” And I said, “But if you do I want you to make me one promise.” And he said, “What’s that?” I said, “I want to go to Washington with you and work on that Urban National Park thing.”

A: Really? Yah?

F: And he said, “Okay.” And so that’s how we started working together.

A: Okay. And why did you say at that point that you didn’t think Paul had a chance of winning?
F: Well again, conventional wisdom was no Democrat of the district for fifty years. Paul had no money. (A: Really?) No money personally. (A: Yah) Hard to raise money. Shy. Hard to ask people for money. Nobody had a perception that he had any chance to win. The whole Watergate thing had not really unfolded. Cronin was running very high in the polls. He had a favorability of over 60%. (A: Wow) People didn’t know who Paul was. I think Paul’s favor, Paul’s favorability was like 20% and this was even after the whole Middlesex Country Campaign Reform and his victory as a reform County Commissioner with some good publicity in the Globe. So it was a, it seemed like a fairly hopeless race.

A: And so how did it come out that he won then?

F: Well one, I hate to say this first, but Watergate. People became a little bit more Democratic because they didn’t like the perception of what the Republican Party and Nixon were doing. (A: Right) So it became a feasible year to be a Democratic. We worked very hard. You know, we were working 20 and 24 hours. We did have a great group of people and volunteers. We were outspent over 2 to 1. It was very hard to raise money until the end of the campaign. We really were very ragtag. We had no help from the political establishment whatsoever locally.

A: So the rest of the Democrats didn’t really pitch in too much?

F: We had some help ultimately from Ted Kennedy and from the Democratic National Committees sent some consultants out our way. (A: Yah) We had some help from some of the more liberal minded Democrats in the area, but the traditional Democrats really didn’t do much at all for Paul. (A: So the) It was a struggle, and again it was because you had a Congressman who was perceived to be a winner, who was depending upon that and trying to keep people from, from supporting Tsongas. And again, people would say, people would walk up to us all the time and they’d say, “You know Paul’s a really good guy. I’ve known him since he was twelve years old. Can you get him to smile? Can you get him to shake hands? Can you get him to do anything to look like he wants to be a Congressman?” So he was unconventional in a lot of ways. But you know then and there he was talking about economic development issues, he was talking about, [A: sneezes] bless you, integrity in government, he was talking about having an energy policy. A lot of the issues that were associated with him for his entire career had you know, had formed. And he had, he had been in the Peace Corps. He had admired Robert Kennedy. He really had a genuineness that most people didn’t see in politicians. And we used to say you know, “What’s the goal of the campaign?” I mean Clinton campaign [unclear] the economy’s too good. And our dictum was sort of if we could get enough people sitting in a room with Paul Tsongas, they would like the guy and vote for him because he was a real person and he had genuine concerns.

A: Yah, okay.
F: And the first headquarters by the way was on, right up here on Church Street. There was a little building that was a cleaners and is now a church across from Danas’ that sells the firearms.

A: Okay, on Andover Street.

F: Yah. And there was actually a Hells Angels Group that lived on the second floor. We were paying $50.00 a month for rent, and we were always trying to drag Paul into the backroom to make fundraising phone calls since we had no money. I mean they promised me $150.00 a week, which I thought was a lot of money at the time, and they never paid me anyway. They never had enough money to pay anybody. When they got to Washington, the worse news I ever got in Washington was that they paid once a month and that we weren’t going to get paid until the end of the month, because everyday it rained the water would go into the holes in the bottom of my shoes because we couldn’t even afford to, you know, I had to wait until I got my first paycheck to buy a pair of shoes. So we were, we weren’t exactly the ah, you know, your image of all this money in politics, somehow it eluded us.

A: [Laughs] Interesting. Other interesting stories on the campaign trail?

F: Let’s see. There was, there was a lot of interesting stories. I mean again, it was a (- -) Campaigns are like the best and worst of everything because they’re just so intense. You’re just, you know you’re up every hour, and you live and die by every report in the papers. I’ll tell you one funny story. One of the things that Paul was doing was challenging Paul Cronin continually to release his tax returns. (A: Okay) Tsongas did it, Cronin didn’t. You know we had, and again everybody is paranoid in these campaigns, but we had these suspicions that there were some blind trust which had been written about in newspapers, and that you know, he really had some wealth and some connections that might be negative if they got out. So that was one of the strategies behind trying to get the tax returns out. Plus we’re in Watergate and people don’t trust public officials. (A: Yah) So Cronin says, “I’ll tell you what. I’ll release my tax returns when you release your legal clients.” Well it was pretty good strategy because in terms of a code of ethics that’s all confidential. And so we said, “Okay Paul, you got to release a list of your clients.” And he said, “Well let’s figure out if we can do it or not.” And everything is immediate in a campaign. So it wasn’t like we were going to do this next week. At three o’clock in the morning Dennis Cannon and a couple of other of the campaign staff members literally woke Dick Donahue out of bed. Went to his house at 3:00 in the morning, let themselves in, knocked on the door. He was either the president of the Bar Association, or had been like the president of the Bar Association, and had a conversation. He said, “No, you can’t do that because again, there’s ethical issues here. Unless you get their permission to do it.” So he said, “Okay, that’s what, you know, we’ll start calling these people.” So I went down to the Fairburn Building. Paul gave me his legal diary for the last couple of years. And I’m looking at these entries and it says, you know, Joe Schmoe, $5.00. Mary Schmoe, $15.00. Now figuring you know, what’s this like a down payment on services or something? I said, “Paul, what are these numbers?” He said, “Those are the fees.” Well it turned out in that last year in his legal
fees he had made like I think it was less than $25,000 for the year. And I said, “This isn’t
the matter of you know, who your clients are. This is just embarrassing how little money
you make, and you want to be a Congressman!” You know, and he said, “Well I haven’t
paid too much attention to law lately.” So anyway we started calling those people. We
couldn’t get through to everybody, but since they had only paid $15.00 and they weren’t
exactly representing IBM, most of them didn’t care. (A: Right) So my greatest concern
was how embarrassing it was. Now we didn’t release the fees, but it was all as a device
to get Paul Cronin, put Paul Cronin in the corner and say, “All right, that’s your
challenge. We’ve met it, now you meet ours. Release your tax returns.”

A: Right.

F: Anyway, we staged this very hokey event. We set up a table outside the IRS in
Andover, which was also Paul Cronin’s home community. (A: Home. Right) And we
had a chair for Paul Cronin with his name on it, and a chair for Paul Tsongas. Paul
Tsongas sat there, gave the press his list, and he actually gave him Xerox list marking out
the people who said, “Don’t use my name.” And we actually, talk about a different era,
we actually said to the press, “You’ve got it, we’ve disclosed it, but we’d ask you not to
use a tremendous amount of specific information that, that might be embarrassing to
people and so forth.” (A: Yah. Yah) And obviously Paul Cronin didn’t show up. We
got a good media hit. The funny thing is the next day in the Lawrence Eagle Tribune
there was a headline that said, “Tsongas releases client list, includes John Wayne and Ted
Kennedy.” Well there was a building contractor in Lowell named John Wayne, and there
was another client by the name of Edward Kennedy who obviously had nothing to do
with those more prominent names. And that was the headline in the Eagle Tribune,
giving Paul credit for being their lawyers.

A: Yah. [Laughs]

F: So I get a kick out of that.

A: Yah. Where were you guys on election night? By the way, there was nobody that ran
against Paul in the Primary for the Democratic side?

F: I don’t believe there was in that year. Two years later Roger Durkin ran. (A: Right)
Let’s see. I’m trying to remember where the party was and I can’t remember off hand.

A: Okay, that’s fine. Um (--)

F: I do remember that you know, after he won, by that time we thought we had a
reasonable chance to win, but it still was somewhat of a long shot. (A: Yah) And
remember when he won and we all realized we might even have a job, not that we had
any money, and so everybody spent several weeks sort of unwinding because he won in
November, obviously he couldn’t go to Washington until January. Nobody was on the
payroll. That’s the other reason we were so poor. But, so I you know, Paul lived on
Fairmount Street at the time. I would hang out there and you know, we’d talk about
getting things started. And it was just you know, exciting to sort of go back over the campaign. And I was actually there the day after he won. And Paul hadn’t shaved. He was in a T Shirt that had you know, holes all over it. And he was sort of rolling around on the floor with the kids, and Nicki was around. And he got a Western Union Telegram from some Congressman in Washington or something. And the kid came to the door and he said, “I’ve got a telegram for you know, Congressman Elect Tsongas.” And Paul went to the door like this, and he said, “I’l take it.” And he said, “I’m sorry I’m only allowed to give it to the Congressman Elect.” [Both laugh]

A: So you guys were totally relaxing (F: Right) after battling and getting sleepless nights, etc. (F: Right) So before you guys headed off to DC, did you, you still were interested in the National Park idea. And so did you and Paul talk about that? Maybe I should preface that question with another one to say, did Paul work on the National Park issue before going to Congress. Was that on the council floor? Was that part of his other agenda while he was in the County, or?

F: Well first of all I remember Paul saying to me when we talked, he said, “I went to Lowell High School. I didn’t know anything about the history of Lowell. I didn’t know that I was you know, next to a mill agent’s house. I didn’t know I was next to a canal that powered the mills. I didn’t know that I was down the street from one of the largest mill complexes in the country.” So he hadn’t been educated on any of that stuff. Obviously he knew, you know, to some extent the story of immigration. His grandfather had come over and it was a pretty ethnic Greek family. (A: Yah) So obviously was familiar and very much affected by that whole history. So I think he sort of discovered the story with a lot of the rest of us, and I think it was fascinating to him too. When he was County Commissioner he testified. Paul Cronin brought a Congressional subcommittee to Lowell. Well what happened was that you know, this is an idea that took a long time to be supported politically. And I think Paul Cronin realized that. He was in a Republican administration. They wanted to do something for him. He was a member of the Authorization Committee and the Interior Subcommittee, which Paul also became a member of, because that’s where the legislation initiated from. And what they did for Paul Cronin was they threw $150,000 at a study, which became the so-called Brown Book. (A: Okay) And that was a federal/state local commission that was headed up by Tom O’Neil, the Lieutenant Governor at the time. Mike Dukakis, Lieutenant Governor. And Paul Cronin had gotten that legislation through to allow a study to be made. And if he had tried to advance the bill as a National Park it would have clearly lost. This was a way to sort of have a holding action claim some success. That really started, and it turned out to be very fortunate. So we basically inherited that study. We inherited working with the State Heritage Park, which had really got a big head start on the National Park. Again with the Armand Lemays, with some people in state government, the Governors Frank Sargent and Mike Dukakis had really been leaders much before the federal government. So we got to work with them. Frank Keefe had since gone on from the city of Lowell to be Planning Director for the state. He was a great champion of the National Park and the Urban Park. And we ended up, and this was really my first job in Washington, was to coordinate this study and make sure that
whatever resulted could be turned into legislation that could be politically supported and
that had some historical integrity.

A: Okay. So was the Brown Book actually published by the time you guys went to
Washington?

F: No.

A: And so where was the status of that kind of $150,000? Had they, they had done some
hearings already?

F: I believe they had just hired, I believe it was Michael Crane and partners, which was
John Lane from that company. Michael Sand who was going to do the cultural stuff.
And [Simeon Bruner], Simeon Bruner from [Gillard and Bruner and Codd], who had
done the piano factory and some historic preservation work in the Boston area. And they
basically set, could do the inventory of the downtown and the potential district, and came
up with a concept of sort of an intensive [U zone], which turned out to be the National
Park area and the Preservation District, (A: Yah) which surrounded the canals and some
of the important areas of the downtown. So they had been selected. They were just
starting to work. Again our job was to say throughout, whatever they came up with had
to support actual legislation. So in Tsongas’ office we were working on the actual
legislation at the time. And in fact the legislation was placed into the Brown Book so that
it would result in something. We just felt that just to do a study and then to have the
results reported wasn’t really going to be meaningful in Washington. It had to be, it had
to be a legislation. It was very ground breaking because urban parks were a hard sell.
Resources were scarce. There was a very big traditional lobby. There were some other
“urban parks” that were being discussed at the time, but you know, everybody there
really saw Lowell as solely an excuse for economic development. And you know, we
had a hard time lobbying. We just (--)

Side A ends.
Side B begins

A: The National Trust for Historic Preservation?

F: Right. We were, we were lobbying with a couple of congressional offices. It was sort
of an informal urban coalition, which included John [Siberling’s] office, a couple of the
representatives from California, George Miller. Joe Moakley locally was pretty active.
These were people who had urban areas and were trying to get National Park
designations. [Siberling] had Cuyahoga and again a lot of similar industrial history. We
were actually being helped by the Sierra Club in some of these Preservation Acts and
some of these groups. But sort of the old foggies at the time was the National Trust. We
actually went to the National Trust [clears throat] and to the Interior Secretary’s Council,
and I don’t remember the formal name. I remember sitting at the Interior Building as
well as the National Trust for Historic Preservation, and they actually, along with the
National Park Service at the time, said that there’s nothing of historical integrity in
Lowell, and that again, their thinking was this is just a pork barrel project to keep a Congressman in office for the rest of his life. And it was extremely frustrating. You know there’s nothing in tact. There’s nothing that can really tell the story. The resources are fragmented. And I think a lot of it was because they were very much scared by the concept. When Bill Whalen who was the Director of the Park Service, came in, Paul Tsongas invited him in when he was getting you know, sworn in., he clearly had been briefed and they were having a discussion about the National Park. Actually it wasn’t when he was sworn in. It was later on. And anytime anybody like that was in the office we were you know, head-on presentation and you know, you’re not going out of there without a pretty good commitment. And during the discussion, so this was actually after the legislation had been introduced, we had had the hearings and the Park Service was negotiating to do less, because they wanted to do something again, much more traditional. And so Bill Whalen came in with a compromise. And the compromise was we take the park area, so-called park area and the intensive use zone, we take ten buildings. The Park Service would go in, they would buy all the buildings and basically that would be the park. You know, it would be a discernable area and then I guess it would open at 9:00 in the morning and close at 5:00. And Paul said, “No, you know, you’re missing it. This is the living part. This is the story. There’s a story that has to do with this. There’s elements of the story that are all over the downtown. They’re in the buildings, they’re in the people, and that’s, that’s not going to work. There were a lot of times that he could have got things through, but he was holding out for what was important. And the other thing that I remember in terms of that, that whole ethic, and we had great people who were working with us on the ground here. I mean we were talking to Pat Mogan every day, and you know, he was lobbying people here. I remember working with Bob Malavich when he was in the city. He was sort of the technical point man. And gee Bob, you know, we need some better pictures of this. We need a line drawing of this. We finally fought and got that Congressional subcommittee to come out to Lowell. And I remember we were all pulling our hair out because that particular day it was like I don’t know, in the 40s. Like you think today, it’s so easy, you’re out on the canal. Well I had to call Mel Lezberg at the time. He was associated with Locks and Canals. “Mel, next Monday bring your boat up from Lexington. We’re getting into the canal. We’re going on a canal ride.” “Well I got to cut the fence open.” “Do that, we don’t care. Cut the fence open.” And they were, they were cooperative. We finally get there and it’s, it’s a nice time of year, but it’s a cold day. It’s raining and Bill Whalen, the Director of the Park Service looks around and there’s like lightening threatening and we’re you know, moving everybody down the mud of the bank, and he looks around and he says, “I don’t know about this weather. Can we skip the tour on the canal?” Everybody said, “No, get on the boat already.” I mean we had come that far and we got through all of that aggravation. He was not getting away without a canal run. And I think there’s still a picture sitting around somewhere with Bill Whalen standing up in a boat with an umbrella over his head going down the canal. But you know, our feeling was once we could get people here and they could understand what was here and meet the people, and again, I keep coming back to somebody like Armand Lemay, you know, people who are really genuine, who understood the importance of history here, and had that, had that passion for telling that story. You know once you got them together with
the right people in the room, they bought into it and they understood this is more than pork barrel. But you know that was a long road.

A: Yah. Let’s, let’s just stop it right there.

F: Okay.

Interview ends.

Tape II, Side A
February 27, 2003

A: Okay, interview with Fred Faust, February 27th, 2003. Before we hit the National Park I just wanted to talk to you about the other two big campaigns during the 70s and what your role and duties and responsibilities were. So the Congressional campaign #2 in ’76, what do you remember about that campaign, and did you, did you take an active part in it?

F: Yah, I came back from Washington to work on the media and the campaign. Paul was challenged by Roger Durkin. And no offense to Roger, but it wasn’t, it wasn’t a serious challenge, especially compared to the difficulty of the race with Paul Cronin. At that point after Watergate the Democrats were pretty solidly in control of the House. Paul had made his way on to the proper committees to start dealing with the National Park, and had a very high favorability rating, and I think was very well personally liked. So despite one scare I had when I stood out at the polling grounds in back of St. Margaret’s, and I happened to be there with Roger Durkin’s father who was holding a Durkin sign, and of course everybody came in and said, “How are you doing? Oh yah, I’m voting for your son. No problem at all.” So I’m saying, “Oh my god, I’m going to lose this district by like 90 to 1.” And when I went back and looked at the results Tsongas had won it about 70/30. So never believe what anyone says. Um but that was, yah there was a definite strength in being the incumbent that year, and being the incumbent generally. So it wasn’t, it wasn’t a very momentous campaign.

A: Now you talked about the kind of tough financial times of running the ’74 campaign. Had that changed for ’76?

F: Well you’re asking me to remember back. Ah, I mean not, not particularly. I mean I think things were getting a little better at that point. It was, it was before some of the double-digit inflation with Jimmy Carter, so it was going to get worse again. But I don’t remember it being, the economy being particularly bad at that time. And again the Democrats were sort of the challenging party there with Gerry Ford in, you know in office, and I guess Jimmy Carter running. So it was a fairly strong Democratic year.

A: Yah, okay. Any other interesting stories from the ’76 campaign?
F: No. It wasn’t the most exciting campaign.

A: Yah, okay. How about the Senate race?

F: The Senate campaign was quite exciting and quite an experience. I was finishing up on the Congressional staff at that point, because I was hoping to come back. And we were wrapping up the Lowell legislation when Paul decided to run. I guess it had just sort of passed. And I was over at Paul and Nicki’s house in Alexandria, Virginia, and Paul in an inimitable way said, “You know, I want to share something with you.” “Okay, what now?” “I’m going to run against Ed Brook, what do you think about that?” I remember we were sitting there working on a half a gallon of ice cream, chocolate ice cream that was opened on the table. And I’m thinking to myself, I just finished this National Park Legislation. Will we ever get a break around here? I was shuttling back and forth for campaigns. So, and Nicki was there too. And I said, “Paul, it’s like Senator Ed Brook, like he’s the national institution, and you’re going to run against him, and he just helped us get the National Park Legislation through. That was one thing I remember. I felt sort of sheepish about that, because his office had been of great assistance in the Senate. And he just said, “Well you know, I don’t really care if I go back to Lowell, or stay in Washington. In a lot of ways I’d like to have my family back in Lowell. So there’s really no downside here for us.” And Nicki sort of reiterated the same points. And I could tell right then they had decided that you know, they were going to go for it. Every race that Paul ran, and he was considered by far the underdog in this one very dramatically, (A: Yah) but we had some confidence that if things broke right that he could win. But, and people didn’t even expect Paul to survive the primary. He was running against Paul Guzzi, he was the Secretary of State, and I’m trying to remember her name, and I will, Kathleen Sullivan [Aliotto], who was thought to have a lot of money and you know had just married the Mayor of San Francisco, and had some clout in the Democratic Party.

A: And even had some connections here in Lowell, right?

F: That’s right. That’s right. And so (--) 

A: Did that work against Paul’s favor at all?

F: She really didn’t turn out to be a serious candidate. She turned out to be sort of a side, very much of a side issue. The strategy in that campaign was to get out in front for a bunch of reasons, and it really worked beautifully. I mean I come back to that many times today working with a council candidate and I’ll say, “Well I’m not supposed to do any advertising until three weeks before the primary.” And I’ve always said, you know, or people are going away for the 4th of July and they’ll be away all month you know. (A: Yah) Well that’s obviously not the case in most places and certainly not in Lowell, Massachusetts. So we had a lot of success. We brought back the tickets ad, which I worked on.
A: What was that?

F: This was an ad where people mispronounced his name. We had this cute little kid who’s probably thirty-five years old now, and actually across the street from Paul and Nicki’s house on Fairmount Street, we filmed, we filmed a couple of ads and this kid just, instead of saying Tsongas we just held the name up he just said in great frustration, “TsTsTs, Tickets!” And you know, you don’t know what’s going to happen when you run an ad particularly on television, because funny things happen between going from the TV set into somebody’s head. But the first weekend we ran the ad he was marching in the parade in Springfield. And it literally had just been on for that weekend. And he said, “You’re not going to believe this, I marched in the parade in Springfield and people were pointing to me and saying, “There’s Tickets.” And it just, we were just fortunate and this ad just really resonated with people, because it had a sense of humor, which most politicians did use, and it also featured some of the things he had done in Lowell. He was actually standing in front of the Market Street Parking Garage before it was built. (A: Okay) We had to make him smile actually. That was part of my job historically. And we were saying, you know, when somebody smiles, when you say, “smile,” they smile and they give you like a 10% smile because you know, they don’t want, it’s not a real smile. So I said, “Paul, at the end of this, this kid is going to say “Tickets” and mispronounce and murder your name. You’ve got to smile because you’ve got to sort of, it’s, you know, you can’t be dead serious,” which we was always being criticized for anyway. So he says, “Come on Fred, do something to make me smile.” And so you know, that’s fine the first time. You stand behind the camera. You make funny faces. But after about the sixteen take you’re running out of things to do. So we were actually throwing pebbles at him. So every time he’d come close to the line I would like mimic like I was going to throw a rock at him, and I was actually cracking him up. So we got him to smile. And you know what was amazing is that when we went back to do that ad and we looked at the shots, and one of the technicians just froze the smile in the middle of one of the frames, and the technician said, “Boy, look at that. That’s a great smile. I like that person.” Had never met him or anything else. And it sort of went back to what I told you before, about our feeling that if you know, enough people could sort of sit down in the living room with Paul. But the Tickets Ad was successful. It got things going. Our ads were so much more obvious than Paul Guzzi’s, that much later Paul Guzzi did an ad. It was sort of a cute ad, and he was like walking around in his front lawn. And he asked the neighbor to put up a sign that said, “Paul Guzzi.” And the neighbor said something like, “Not in my front yard you don’t.” You know, it was sort of cute. And the next couple of days Paul came back. He says, “You won’t believe this but people are saying to me, “You know that thing about putting the sign up in your front lawn is funny.” So by getting on early, and establishing Paul in a visible way, and using a sense of humor, we had sort of captured that part of the campaign.

A: Wow. So that was a unique positive sign from early on.

F: Right. And again the more people knew about Paul and the you know, working class town, but somebody who had been in the Peace Corps and was pretty worldly, and again had a sense of humor. He was obviously a very serious guy. He was very well respected
as always by the media, he got a boost out of that. And actually you know, beat Guzzi by like five or six points. We knew that. We were pretty sure that was going to happen coming up to the end of the campaign. We were seeing very favorable polling. And the other thing that happened at the same time as Tsongas was knocking off Guzzi, is that the Boston Globe really was doing a sort ofsavaging of Ed Brook in terms of some financial dealings he had in the Caribbean, which were part of an ugly sort of divorce that was going on, and criticism from his daughter. So this you know, somewhat invulnerable statesman senator who was the only African-American in the senate at the time, all of a sudden you know, his reputation started to be tarnished. Here’s this young ethnic politician who seems to be on the rise and has a sense of humor, capturing everybody’s imagination, and Brook was seen as sort of part of the Washington establishment at that time. And again, with democratic, strong democratic sentiment by again, the time the race came around it wasn’t even that close. So it was a pretty amazing campaign, and again it was [bootstraps], and Brook outspent Tsongas like 2 to 1.

A: Really.

F: But it was, it was a heck of a campaign. Paul was ceaseless in terms of campaigning, and it was a very rewarding experience.

A: How much time by the time Paul told you he was going to run, and the election, or the primary at least?

F: Well the National Park Legislation was passed again right about the time he started to talk about running. So that would go back to (A: May or June of?), yah, May, May/Jun eof ’78.

A: Yah. So you really only had a few months before the primary, like the summer of ’78 to get, to get a campaign up and running.

F: Um, no. It was ’79. We had a year.

A: Oh the election was in ’79?

F: Yah because I believe he took office in ’80.

A: I thought he, no I think he was elected in ’79.

F: ’79. There had to be more time than a couple of months. I’d have to go back and look, (A: Okay, yah) because it wasn’t, it wasn’t that brief a campaign.

A: You wished it was that brief.

F: I wouldn’t remember it, yah. Right.
A: Now, we’re going to jump into the National Park now, and some of this you had talked about a little bit before, but Brad Morse had kind of got the thing rolling. What was the role if you know, of Brad and Paul when Paul was working as an intern?

F: Right. Well that’s, that’s really interesting. I mean Brad Morse and Paul Tsongas are about as different personalities as you can imagine. And again, Paul’s father was a Republican and Paul I think thought that he was a Republican for a while, and he always would say that he was really inspired to public service by Robert Kennedy and concepts of the service for America and the Peace Corps. So I guess he became a confirmed Democrat after that. I’m not sure he ever was a real Republican, but certainly that was the family’s orientation. And Brad Morse was somebody who really crossed the party lines and was sort of larger than life and was a great politician, and somebody who had a wider and worldlier view witness his service in the United Nations, at the United Nations afterwards. Um, and he was a fairly liberal Republican. So he was quite accepted politically for this area, but he was just a very warm personality and I remember him coming into the Congressional Office in Washington and he introduced himself around. I don’t think I had met him. Well I had met him originally in the early Park Service days, but near early days advancing the park, but not like on a one to one basis. (A: Yah) And he came in the office and he just shook everybody’s hand. He went around and he said, “Hi, I’m Brad Morse, I used to work here.” (A: Okay) Which was great. And so Paul worked for him as an intern and actually met Nicki in Washington at that time. She was working in another office. (A: Okay) That was really I think Paul’s first exposure to politics, and he always, always had a high regard for Brad Morse and was always very respectful towards him. And Brad Morse, obviously working with Pat Mogan had really gotten the beginnings of the National Park and the value of the you know, personal histories going to Lowell.

A: Okay. What would you say would be the role of the Human Services Corporation in leading towards the National Park?

F: Well no doubt in my mind that if there wasn’t a Human Services Corporation there wouldn’t have been a National Park, or there wouldn’t have been anything that was as meaningful as what turned into the National Park. Since that time I’ve seen a lot of communities who have you know, said, “Well you know we want to have a park. We want to have something similar to Lowell.” And the first thing that I always say to them is that this is not a top down kind of thing. This is not something you just sort of decide and it drops down on people. This is not something you just say to the Park Service, you know, “We just want to have you in here.” I mentioned to you that last time we spoke that when the legislation was passed there was a parade. You know, was there, was it a contrived parade? No, it was a parade because people were proud that their story had been recognized and that they had been part of that recognition. Personally in terms of the lobbying and in terms of the recognition of the role of working people and immigrants in Lowell and the country, and National Park so often you know, we’ll honor this president, or where this person was born, or where this battle was fought. And the idea of having a park that really honored people for working and for carrying out the traditions of labor and immigration for something that was really resistant, as we talked
about very much by the National Park Service and by a lot of the decision makers at the time. And probably for some good reasons, but I think there’s some snobbiness. There was some snobbiness there. And so this was sort of a real victory for people in Lowell and for the cultures they represented. Human Services Corporation was really like Pat Mogan, sort of relentless. I mean they, they grasped on to the fact that people and their stories, and their ethnic backgrounds were important, and that America really wasn’t the melting pot, and that the paradigm of a melting pot where everybody blended into one, was not necessarily something that was good for the country in terms of knowledge of history and then knowledge of what the country is all about. And you had so many outstanding people that came together. The Peter Stamas, Lillian Lamoureux, one of the most articulate people I’ve ever met, and obviously Pat Mogan, and others who were able to articulate what the story was all about and why it was important to consider the history and the personal histories because so many people in Lowell had been taught as I mention with Paul Tsongas, that bad things happen. The mills, bad, don’t even talk about them. The industrial history; the unemployment, bad, it was all bad. And of course it was bad in terms of conditions that people were putting up with, but it’s part of not only the history of the country, but their individual and personal histories. And the genius I think of Human Services and Pat Mogan was to take something that was so negative and turn it into something positive for the community. And I think that’s, that’s one of the genius of that process. And so it really was bottom-up support. People felt pride. People wanted the park. It wasn’t like something that just a politician was trying to do. It wasn’t a contrivance for economic development. It was about our story and the recognition of an important role. And that just made everything a lot more meaningful.

A: Okay. A couple of entities that kind of preceded the park would be the State Heritage Park and then the Historic Canal District Commission. What do you know about the creation of those, and the leaders of the movements to create those two entities?

F: Right. Well in terms of the State Heritage Park, again the federal government was very concerned that it would have to shoulder the burden for economic development tasks, urban renewal tasks, and that even the interpretive and recreation tasks. And so it was incredibly important for credibility to have groups like Human Services, the City of Lowell and the Commonwealth take on these concepts. And so that when we went to Washington, we went to Congress, we were able to say, “You’re just going to be one of the partners. You’re not going to be first. You’re not going to be second. This is all happening there. You’re one of the partners, and all these various responsibilities will have collective obligations, and that not only from the point of view of minimizing the resources, but again from an operating point of view and from a credibility point of view. So actually the state was ahead, well ahead of the federal government. And it was because you had a Mike Dukakis. Well really first a Frank Sargent, who was a lobby. And I remember coming to Lowell and going to remarks that he made a Pollard’s Restaurant. And he was talking about transportation, and he was talking about his new idea of at this time it was called the Urban Cultural Park. (A: Right) And he endorsed it and he was going to have his Park’s people and other folks work on this as a commitment to Brad Morse and others. And eventually Mike Dukakis really played a very, very important role. His family had been from Lowell. He understood, grasped the concept
right away. He was really a downtown kind of guy. He had a warm spot in his heart for Lowell. He was obviously easily lobbied by a Paul Tsongas. He eventually brought Frank Keefe, who had been a Planning Director in Lowell, on board to be his essentially State Planning Director. And that sort of cinched that whole relationship, because that, Frank had been working in a parallel way as Pat Mogan, Human Services, had been working. And Frank understood the potential for the economic development. Very creative, very imaginative, and really Frank and a fellow planner by the name of [name unclear] were really responsible for moving the DPD from sort of a somewhat prehistoric, pun intended, agency that you know, dealt with one deal here and one deal there, to really a vision of what Lowell could be like. And I think they saw twenty years ahead the kinds of things that could happen. So that was an incredible alliance with Frank Keefe, Mike Dukakis. And the other key player there at the time was Armand Mercier, Armand Lemay. And Armand Mercier played a strong role too, but Armand Lemay as the Mayor was you know, in a sense of a Rita Mercier, an incredible cheerleader for this concept. And again, a lot of politicians really didn’t get it at all. And they were, they were sort of jealous. There was just a natural sort of competition with again, the Paul Tsongas and sort of new guys on the block. And Armand Lemay was able to bridge that. He understood the importance. He was a very positive force. He had a close relationship, had backed Mike Dukakis, eventually went to work for the state government and furthered a lot of these plans, but Armand was literally out in the trenches all the time working with the National Park, you know, ultimately. Mike Dukakis with the State Heritage Park; with the Human Services folks, with the City Council. His leadership on the city council was amazing and unique. So it was really quite, quite an effort, because then again, you were dealing in an environment where there were so many negatives, and so many disbelievers, that you, you know, you really needed that core of people, the believers, the positive thinkers, the forward thinkers, to overcome a lot of the inertia that you know, Lowell had dealt with for years. And I should mention the Lowell Sun too.

A: Yah.

F: The Lowell Sun really bought into the concept. Again, Brad Morse and even Paul Cronin had a strong relationship with the Sun. Paul Tsongas had a mixed relationship with the Sun, because he got into some scuffles, as a lot of political people did, with Clemie Costello, the publisher who was certainly a character in his own right. But the interesting thing about Clemie is he wanted to build up Lowell. So one day he could write an editorial about annexing Canada and Mexico, but the next day he could talk about Lowell’s marvelous concept for a National Park, or an Urban Cultural Park. Pat Mogan did a great job sort of getting them on board and making them understand the educational connections. But the Sun was a key player in terms of changing the environment and talking about the value of history. And there were a core of some great young writers around the Sun at the time that really bought into the concept, including Frank Phillips, Chris Black, Carolyn [Meagal], you know, a bunch of excellent reporters who went on to have you know, national careers and so forth. And Kendall Wallace was supported as well.
A: Yah, yah. What was Paul’s relationship with Clemie?

F: Well Clemie is a guy you sort of just put up with, jousted with, because again he was in some ways so conservative and so off the deep end, and such a character personally, that it was really hard to have a steady relationship with the guy. But that was, you know, that was the publisher and the editorial piece. There was no difference at that point. There is today. So you know, you took your hits but you got some positive publicity. So the reporters really had a totally different ethic from the publisher at that time. Again I have to give Clemie Costello credit. He, he wasn’t confusing about what he was for and against. He was very straightforward, and it was because of personal philosophy. And that I think is respectable. And again, when it came to certain issues he pushed the paper in those directions. Again, very supportive of the, of the National Park and Pat Mogan, and that whole concept, number one; very supportive of economic development in the private sector, and very supportive of reform. Paul Tsongas probably wouldn’t have been a County Commissioner without the Lowell Sun’s editorials and others. So while Clemie could be the strongest, no, he really, there was no you know, Ronald Reagan hadn’t really emerged at this time, but I would say Clemie Costello was cut from the same cloth. And yet here was somebody who just felt that government should be honest and you should get what you pay for. And again, that’s something that you have to respect. So that sort of fit in to the theme of reform and better government, and for government being a partner. And Clemie supported those themes continually.

A: Okay, good. Steps while in Congress. You got, you went to Washington and you guys hit the ground running on kind of the heels of what Brad Morse and Paul Cronin had done, right?

F: Right. Well as I mentioned that the so-called Brown Book came out, which was a study that was done by the Lowell Historic District Canal Commission, which was the entity, set up by Paul Cronin’s legislation.

A: Okay.

F: And the nice thing about that again, was it set the coalition in motion. Tom O’Neil, who at that point was the Lieutenant Governor of Massachusetts under Mike Dukakis, and who obviously was the son of Tip O’Neil, which didn’t hurt at all, was the Chair of the Commission. I had federal, state and local members. And even the people who were a little bit dubious were brought along so they could understand the value of the concept. And again the fact that we were always having to sell, “This was not just an economic development project. This is a nationally significant story that happens to tie in with economic development.”

A: Yah.

F: And so you had a very strong, intelligent, active group of, of members. And at the time you know, we, for the first meetings of the new commission, we actually had the, the Secretary of Interiors designated the Assistant Secretary of Interior attend our
meeting. We had the Director of the National Park Service. We had really high-level people who were representing federal/state and local agencies that could tap right in to this whole partnership concept, and make a difference. And I would have to give credit to John Lane and Dennis Frenchman, and their whole team who put the Brown Book together. (A: Okay) I was just at a panel on the Central Artery a week ago and I grabbed the Brown Book, and I looked at it and read through the first couple of pages because Central Artery, you know, I don’t know what it is, 50 acres of newly created green space in the middle of urban Boston. (A: Right) There’s a concept to get your arms around. And I went back and I read the part of the Brown Book that talked about how too often in America we move so quickly that we forget about our roots. We forget about working people. We forget about what really built America and how to look back at it, and how to interpret it to future generations. The Brown Book really was a great plan and if you looked at it, a lot of the kinds of things that it envisioned really happened, which is, which is amazing because it was so ambitious.

A: [Sneezes]

F: Bless you.

A: Thanks.

F: So that Brown Book was really the beginnings of the plan and the vision put on paper, that all of these other people had been working on but had never really [quantified].

A: Okay. So while you pushed this through Congress was there any setbacks during the kind of legislative calendar?

F: Oh there were setbacks every day. (A: Yah) Again I mentioned to you that we literally had a list of every house member in back of my desk. And Paul would come back and say, you know, I lost in racket ball to George Miller from California, but the good news is he’s going to sign on as co-sponsor. And so every day he would be picking off members to sign on, to get support from. I was working where the coalition of urban park enthusiast people sort of in the back room of the Interior Department, people at the Sierra Club, people at Preservation Action, people who really wanted to see this happen as a model, and appreciated you know, what was being done. And that this was important for the country, not just for Lowell. And I mentioned you know, John [Siberling] from the tire family I think in the early hearings where we started to try some of these concepts out. We brought Pat Mogan up. And [Siberling] said, “Why in the world should I support you? I got plenty of factories in my district. Why should I support this in Lowell, Massachusetts.” And it was a shock, because he was a natural ally. And in fact his legislative assistant was one of our strongest supporters, and had previously worked for the National Park Service, somebody who had incredible respect on Capital Hill. And Siberling just sort of blew us away. So we had to go back. And we had to start doing the homework again, and making the case for historic significance, rather than anything having to do with economic development. You know how Clinton put up on the wall, “Is Economy Stupid?” (A: Yah) Well our sign would have been,
“It’s not economic development, stupid.” We could, that’s not something that could be mentioned at that time. And it really was like building a brick wall one brick at a time. You know, at least neutralizing certain people who could be opponents. And again at the time you know, you were working with a Democratic administration, Carter administration, but Jimmy Carter people don’t remember it was you know, a huge deficit hawk. And the OMB was not approving, Office Management Budget was not approving anything. They were cutting back budgets, operating monies. So that was setting up another situation where the National Park Service who might have opened some of these things, were saying, “This is going to erode the money for the Yellowstone and the Yosemites, we really have to minimize these things or oppose them.” And their inclination was to oppose them from the beginning. And getting the National Park over an objection of your own Democratic administration, at that particular time when everybody was very conscious of budgets and you had 16% inflation, and the gas stuff was going on, (A: Yah, yah) it was, it was, it was extremely difficult. The thing that made a difference was Paul Tsongas’ tenacity. Going to all of those hearings, being very well respected. And Paul had the ability to be a clear thinker and be able to sum things up. He just won a lot of people’s respect with his intelligence and the fact that he was not your backslapping politician. He cultivated people on the committee. He worked very hard on Massachusetts delegation, and he worked very hard on Tip O’Neil, which again having Tom O’Neil on board didn’t hurt.

A: How did they get Tom on board originally?

F: Well Tom was asked to be the chair of the Canal District Commission, and at that point it became something that you know, he could take credit for. He was enthusiastic about it. He was a good political player in the trenches. He had a whole different level of contacts than Tsongas had. And he was, you know, he was a strong lobbyist. And just by virtue of him being involved meant that Tip was you know, going to be a good supporter. (A: Yah) Which he would have been, because he was very well to the delegation.

A: Yah. So did Paul ask Tom to take that on, or Mike Dukakis maybe?

F: Um, I don’t, I don’t remember how, how that ended up being Tom O’Neil. I think it was in really a transitional time between Cronin and Tsongas. And it probably was a, it probably was a (--) I’m not sure if Paul had an involvement in that, or Paul Cronin, but you know, because of Tip O’Neil’s role it was I think an obvious thing. Mike Dukakis I’m sure had some you know, some ideas along that front and probably asked Tom to do that. And Mary Ellen Fitzpatrick, who was from Lowell, Pat Mogan’s niece, worked for Tom O’Neil at the time, and I know there was a contact there. Mary Ellen could probably tell you how that happened.

A: Yah, yah. Okay. So how did you guys convince like Rep [Siberling] to, to go over to Lowell?
F: Well I think again that we moved away from the economic development stuff, and we talked about historic significance. And we built that case and we had you know, scholars and we had, we built up all of the information about the labor history, the immigrants, the fact that this was not a story told, that it was a neglected part of the history within the Park Service. And again I think just Paul’s loyalty and the respect that he commanded on the authorizing committee, the time just came around where it had enough merit and it was somebody on the committee who was making a proposal, who had done his homework and put in his time, was serious and well respected, and so had a leg up at least in getting the legislation authorized. The next step was to get that support on the larger committee, because this was the Interior Subcommittee. And (--) 

A: Now Siberling was the chair of the subcommittee? 

F: Siberling was chair of the subcommittee. So basically Paul sort of wore him down, his assistant wore him down, and again he understood more about Lowell and became one of the strongest supporters, spoke on the floor for the legislation (A: Okay) and came up to Lowell and was thrilled by what he saw. And (--) 

A: Who were some of the other key Congressional supporters outside of say, Massachusetts? 

F: Well the Massachusetts Delegation was very important. Joe Moakley helped to get a rule for the legislation. Ed Brook was very important because he could work with the Republican side. And the Republicans, especially in the house, were these conservative, very conservative Republicans who opposed everything other than parks in their on district, you know, which were 200 miles wide by 100 miles long. And the idea that Lowell would ever be a park was going to be over their dead bodies. So they kept on throwing amendments and trying to come up with delaying tactics. In some cases they were aided by you know, by the Park Service mentality of “Oh my god, we actually have to manage an urban area.” 

A: Who were some of the chief opponents from the Republican side? 

F: Um, I can picture them and I cannot remember their names right now, but I may as we talk. But there were three or four who were fairly senior members from the west who were (A: Okay) very much opposed. I mean it became a sort of east/west kind of confrontation. 

A: Really. 

F: You know ultimately Paul got the Park Service to support something close to what he wanted and he fought for the full legislation on the floor. Other supporters were again you know, some of the urban folks. Sid Yates, the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, who ended up getting the Navy Pier in Chicago, was a strong supporter. He was close to Tip O’Neil. He was a great guy. And he, he supported the legislation.
A: He was from Chicago area?

F: He was from Chicago. He was a very senior member. Manual [Louhan] from New Mexico was on the Interior Committee. He was supportive. I mentioned George Miller from California who had I believe Santa Monica district. He was angling for a park there. He was a strong supporter on the, on the committee. Again Tip O’Neil did a lot of lobbying. Really I’d say came down to (--) The other guy that was an interesting case was a guy by the name of Phil [Burton] who was a Congressman from California, who became Chairman of the Subcommittee, and had an omnibus bill, which was inclusive, it was a political strategy. Well if we give something to everybody in the country we’ll get the legislation done. We had really staked out and given Lowell credibility, and spent a couple of years doing it. We didn’t want to get any omnibus bus because we thought that the whole bill could be defeated. But we didn’t want to offend Phil [Burton] either. So at one point I believe we were in both the omnibus bill and a separate piece of legislation. What was suggested to try and beat the omnibus bill and to get right in and out on the floor, because we had built a strong consensus on the, on the committee at this point, was to go for a suspension of the rules and get a 2/3 vote. And that’s something that Moakley, and Tsongas, and Tip O’Neil had done. And there were a couple of people on the Appropriations Committee, the staff director for the Republicans, a guy by the name of Clay Peters, and then the Democratic guy, Cleve [Pinnicks]. They were from again, they were basically selected by either western, or some of the southern members of Congress who had seniority. And it’s two guys. They worked very closely together. They were like ying and yang. Cleve [Pinnicks] was a great supporter, very knowledgeable. Nothing would get through without at least having the majority side on the Appropriations, the Appropriations and Authorizations folks. He was on the Authorization Committee. And Clay Peters, while he was, I had a lot of respect for him, but he was, he was respectfully opposed to the legislation of working with some of these Republicans, and continually trying to dilute or push off the legislation. So actually went in for a suspension of the rules, and I mean this was something that I was working on 23 hours a day, and then Paul was by this time, and you know, at the time I was in my 20s. It was really a big deal. You know the staff doesn’t really get to go on the floor, or watch the debate very often. You’re just working. (A: Yah) And you don’t get to go onto the floor except you know, with a very special circumstance. And at the beginning of the debate you know, Paul got a pass for me through the Speaker’s office and I went to the, you know, through the doors onto the floor when Paul introduced the legislation, and then watched part of the debate from the gallery. So it was, it was a thrill. (A: Wow) And again I had, we had legislative counsel. We had physically written the legislation. So something you actually wrote, you know, is going to the House of Representatives in Washington. And so it was, it was a real thrill.

Anyway, and we were calling back to Lowell. And Bob Malavich and I were talking, and other people were talking every day, you know, this strategy and that strategy, and how are things doing? We were lobbying all over the place. But you know, one of the stories that I’ve told a lot, but you know, it’s one of my favorite stories is that suspension vote lost by like six votes. (A: Okay) And so we were, you know, this was maybe the National Park legislation going down for a year more. You know, at that point if Paul was thinking about running for the Senate, this was like a major feather in his cap.
He wasn’t going to be able to do that. I mean there were a lot of things banking on this legislation. People expected that this was going to pass. We lost by six votes, and we went back and we looked down the names. And a lot of them were Democrats. And it turned out that a lot of them were just offended by the fact that we went for a suspension of the rules on something that the Republicans considered very susceptive. And they took along some conservative democrats. So Leo Dhiel, who was Tip O’Neil Administrative Assistant, which is the head of the office and a very savvy guy, and you know, again a guy I had ultimate respect for.

A: How do you spell his last name?

F: I think it’s D H I E L. (A: Okay) And you know, he was, he was an older guy and you only talked to him when big stuff was happening you know. And he was, so he was probably in his 50s, and again, you know, I was like in my late 20s, and was pretty amazing. So he said, “Come over and we can talk some strategies.” So I went over and he said, “Here’s what we want you to do,” you know, “The Speaker is going to talk to a couple of people, but he needs to have a letter, and we need to have it by the end of the day. And you got to, it’s got to say why people are going to support this legislation. He’s going to go to every Democrat personally who didn’t support the suspension of the rules and we’ll pick up six votes. So I’m trying to like, on my old IBM Selectric I’m trying to type this thing out. I’m so nervous. So I go home. I drive back to Alexandria. I got to finish this by the end of the day, but I need someplace with peace and quiet. I go home, I write this whole thing out. I finish it. I bring it back. I type it. It’s like a page and a half. I go back through it. It’s like a page and a quarter. I reduce the size of the type. It’s like barely fitting into a page, because I had to get every single reason why the Lowell National Historical Park bill should pass. And I finally finish it and I cram it on to one page, and I run it over to Leo Dhiel, and you know he says it gave me a thrill. I says, “Here’s the, you know, here’s our letterhead.” And he said, “Just leave space for Tip to sign this,” you know. I says, “Oh my God, I’m writing a letter for Tip O’Neil.”

So the next day, which is why he had to have the letter, you know at the, at the end of the session they bring this legislation back up. And only at that point had it passed by majority and [hit a rule] was on the agenda, and it passed overwhelmingly. And I got a call from a friend of mine who was working for Dale Milford, who was a Congressman from Texas, who was a conservative Congressman. And he said, “Congratulations,” you know. And he said, “You know that letter from Tip turned the Congressmen’s vote around.” I said, “Wow am I important!” I said, you know what, I never even ended up with a copy of the letter, because (A: Oh really) it was sent out to individuals. So you know, “Can I get a copy of the letter that was sent to the Congressmen and signed by Tip O’Neil?” So he said, “Sure, I’ll come right over with it.” So he comes over, he walks the letter over. All this time that I took to put all the stuff in the letter, I look at this letter, the letter is one sentence long. And the letter says, “Paul Tsongas and I would appreciate if you would vote for the Lowell National Historical Park legislation, signed Tip O’Neil.”

A: So Leo Dhiel had edited down to (--)
F: Somebody, yes, somebody had taken all of my great work out and got to the kernel of the issue, which is if you’re a Democrat and Tip O’Neil asks you to do something, you’re going to support it. That was my, that’s my great lobbying effort for the National Park Bill.

A: Do you have to go now?

F: Shortly.

A: Oh okay. How did (--) How did folks get Ed Brook in, involved?

F: Well I think with, you know, with respect to Ed Brook he got involved for the right reasons. He saw the importance of the legislation, politically obviously if he could be involved he would get some credit for it. But actually again, because he was a Republican and we had to convince Republicans, we really had the kind of people that Ted Kennedy could get to support us we were really going to have anyway. (A: Yah) So. Can you hold on a second?

A: Sure.

Side A ends.

Side B begins.

A: Um, we were talking about Ed Brook. Did, had Brad Morse already got him helping out, or did Paul get him?

F: Well those events were pretty far removed. I mean Brad Morse really wasn’t very much involved after he left the House. (A: Yah, yah) He had other things to worry about. (A: Right) But no, Ed Brook I think got involved for the right reasons. He was, he was effective. He was on I believe the Interior Committee, which obviously makes a difference in the Senate side, (A: Okay) and we worked with his staff around the committee and she, she was very effective. So I mean the House really, once the House passed the legislation then the you know, the Senate thanks to the loyalty and the nature of the institution and the Senate, they were going to, they were going to take it up, but it would have definitely been a problem without having a Brook support.

A: Okay. You talked a little bit about the National Park resistance to the idea. (F: Umhm) Let me move on to some other local advocates. You talked about Pat Mogan, Peter Stamas. How about Gordon Marker?

F: Well Gordon Marker participated in a lot of the early planning work for Human Services. You know Gordon was sort of phasing out when, when I came in. (A: Okay) So he really wasn’t that involved in the, in the Brown Book.

A: Okay. So he’s much earlier in some regards.
F: I mean he was there when I was around, but he was sort of phasing out.

A: Yah. How about Eldred Field?

F: Eldred was a very interesting guy. I mean there were all kinds of issues in the reports, and stories swirling around Locks and Canals, and the pension funded the Teamsters, and all kinds of you know, great [unclear]. Eldred was a very smooth intelligent character. (A: Yah) I dealt with him more afterwards when we were trying to get rights on the canals to use the boats. Every year we’d have to go back with the Park Service and negotiate. Somehow I sort of got roped into that role, because I was more local than the Park Service. That every year Eldred would complain and complain, and say this is costing them so much money, and there’s so much liability here; and that we should just buy the whole canal system, and then every year he would say at the end, “All right, you can use it for a buck, and just pay you know, pay something nominal.” So you know, again I was very young, and he was very senior. And some of the stories about all kinds of things that were, were going on I sort of was careful in dealing with him. But it was sort of fun to deal with him, because he was very, very bright. He was very sharp. (A: Yah) And you know, you were always leaving the office and making sure that you still as they say, “Had all of your fingers,” because he was one tough negotiator, and you know, and a character. And I’m sure that he could have told some amazing stories. There were a lot of people that thought that the whole National Park was a scheme to enrich the Locks and Canals folks, (A: Ah huh) and the owners of the Boott Mills at the time. And that’s something that we had to cope with. I mean that’s sort of your old Lowell politics. And I mean when I walked in to that situation I didn’t know about any of it. And I mean even after the state eventually got certain rights, there were a lot of people who thought that there had been you know, a sweatheart deal. So there were some great conspiracy theories that were around Lowell in those days, and that was one of them.

A: Yah. Okay. How about the Union Bank, and Ray Miller, Dick Alden guys? They helped Paul like with the LDFC and other things. Did they have any role with the National Park?

F: Um, yes, some role. I mean Ray Miller was one of the most articulate people I’ve ever met. I remember going to an early meeting of a business group. I don’t remember if it was Chamber of Commerce, or something, but it was actually at the Yorick Club, which is now Cobblestones. (A: Right) And Ray Miller got up and made a lot of sense of a lot of the things we’re talking about in terms of economic development issues in the history of the city. I just remember being very impressed at how he had his act together, and that he was sort of, seemed to be a born leader. The Union National Bank was, as we talked about before, the dominant financial institution. Even if you look today at a lot of the people who were important in the banking community, the George Duncan’s and so forth, a lot of them came out of the Union National Bank. (A: Right. Right) So you had to go to Union National Bank if you were going to talk about a Lowell Development Financial Corporation, a Lowell Plan. Dick Alden I believe succeeded Ray before the, you know, at the beginning of the numerous mergers. Dick too was a very sharp,
intelligent guy with a lot of integrity, who you know, was somewhat conservative and had to be sold on this whole concept, but was a strong leader in the business community and somebody who cared about the community. Really, I mean George Duncan was really the guy who was working behind the scenes on the LDFC. (A: Oh really) Absolutely. You know he was not the president of a bank at that point, but he had again a vision. You know all the people we’re talking about, the people who were most influential really shared a vision of what the community could be like and then been really true to that vision for decades. And George Duncan’s one of those, those people. You know George started out as sort of a quiet, shy, junior banker (A: Umhm) at Union National Bank. He might not even have been a banker when he started. I don’t quite remember anything. You know, a teller I guess. But George really was very close to Paul. They worked, they worked together well. They really, George really fed Paul intelligent (--) Paul was always challenging the banking community. And they had a very sort of love/hate relationship, but George was really the mechanic who helped him figure out how to do these things. He you know, drafted a guy by the name of Michael [Putsiger] at the time with [Roache [unclear] who had set up some of these loan funds before. And they worked with the LDF, or they worked with the original legislation that set up the LDFC and that’s an association that again George Duncan has had for a number of years, and there’s still counsel for the LDFC today. But George really worked behind the scenes to help sort of lobby the banks. It was a great one/two combination, because George could go into the bankers and say, “Paul Tsongas is going to beat your brains in if you know, you don’t do this, but you know, he was, “I’m on your side. I’ll find a painless way for you to do it. Paul, go beat this guy’s brains in, he’s not cooperating.” And at the time there were just about twenty banks in Lowell. They had to get them all together and never even talked to each other. And they got them to commit a percentage of their savings, and again what was going on there, which is hard to believe today, is that the banks were not investing in downtown Lowell. Okay, you know, you want to do something in downtown Lowell, forget it. Would you want, do you want to put up 50% equity? So there wasn’t even the pattern of investing in the downtown at that point. (A: Wow) What the LDFC did, what really worked was that it forced the bankers to look at downtown investments. It gave them a pool of money so that they reduce their risk. And all of a sudden people started you know, legitimate business people, the Gil Campbells and so forth, came in and started making investments. Banks wanted to work with them as their, as their clients. And all of a sudden it was the tail wagging the dog. Now even though the LDFC constituted 10 or 20% of the loan, they were taking the risk. They were familiarizing the banks with the deals. They were sharing the risk. And all of a sudden you know, it was working and downtown was a legitimate destination and a legitimate investment opportunity.

A: Yah. So was the Union Bank one of those banks that Paul had to really convince to participate?

F: No I don’t, you know, I don’t think so. I think it was really some of the smaller banks that, that never had really worked with the community, and were investing outside of the community. I think the Union National Bank was you know, on board to a good extent.
A: Yah. Okay. You talked about Armand Lemay. Any other people that were strong local advocates for the National Park here?

F: Let’s see. You know I mentioned Bob Malavich, who worked on the Park for a long time. (A: Uh huh) Um, I mentioned Frank Keefe, Bob Gilman as Director of Planning and Development, (A: Okay) and was strong advocate for developing the downtown and supportive of the Park. The whole Wang deal. And again he was with Bill Taupier, who wasn’t always the easiest person to work with, and certainly at the beginning didn’t have much respect for the park. So being able to work with a Bob Gilman, and sort of to water down some of those sentiments and emotions. I remember (A: Who?) the first meeting I went to (A: Yah) with Bill Taupier and John Duff, John Duff was, and that’s another name I should mention. John Duff, who was the President of UMass Lowell, or at the time University of Lowell. John, I think I did talk about him a little bit in our first session, but he was a very again, worldly guy, very bright guy, but also a very good politician. And he played the power game and people needed to stay on his good side. He was very influential in dealing with some of the local people. He brought up the stature of the local participants with the Commission and the Park. (A: Yah) And anyway, John (--) And Bill Taupier was elected City Manager, and I never met the guy before I believe. No I wouldn’t have. And so we went to a meeting. The City Manager’s office used to be on the other side of the corridor, and there was a big long table that he sort of used as a desk, and he sat all the way at one end. (A: Yah) And you know, he had to be there a little while because he was talking conversantly about some of these issues. So, and then he had. He actually has I think about, he had been there for a while, but we hadn’t really had much dealings. And the Commission was new. That’s right, because he was, I had my [unclear] during the famous snowstorm of ’78. So, but you know, we had to have a relationship. He had appointments on the city council, which were actually, he had some excellent appointments I have to say to his credit. (A: Ah huh) But anyway, philosophically we, we were and probably still are very, very different people. And he really had a habit of sort of down playing the National Park, and talking about the importance of the business community, and not seeing much of a relation between them. You know he thought the National Park was sort of nice window dressing, but you know, give me a real company like Wang any day. And that’s what he was working on. So anyway I went to this meeting at City Hall with John Duff, and I guess Bill and I maybe anticipated some tension in our relationship. Not that I was a particularly significant player anyway. The guy was the City Manager, but went to the meeting and John was going to be there trying to sell him on something. And I think it may have been actually the Historic Board, and the Historic Board legislation. (A: Umhm) And I was sitting at one end of the table with John Duff, and Taupier was sitting at the other end. And Taupier, before the meeting even was getting started, was just bad mouthing the Park, and bad mouthing the legislation, and bad mouthing everything that we believed in. However I got so frustrated that I threw my appointment book across the table. And John Duff looked at me with horror in his eyes. And afterwards he grabbed me and he said, “You’ve got to control your feelings at these meetings.” He said, “I know that Bill has sort of a wild character, but you can’t be throwing your book across the table in the City Manager’s office.” That’s how frustrated I got for one of the first times dealing with Bill Taupier.
A: Yah. Why was he opposed to the National Park with all of the resources that it brought?

F: I think it was a combination of things. I think that a lot of the people what were opposed to the park, or downplayed the part, it wasn’t so much that they were against the park, but it was because it got so much attention and people felt that it was just a piece of the puzzle. That Tsongas and the park were getting too much credit. You know they felt that it would never really play that significant a role economically or any other way. And I think that some of those people really had a lesser view of what the whole park story was about, and the people who had been part of it. So there was a political division. So they weren’t that you know, enamored of Paul Tsongas. They thought he was getting too much credit. That everything giving the park was giving Tsongas credit. And I think some of them were jealous. I think also you know, again, Bill Taupier was putting together deals with Wang, which of course, which certainly to his credit, and making the city of Lowell business friendly, which is to his credit. It hadn’t been. And that was a huge turning point. And he just had, and has a, you know, a certain personality and a loud voice and he likes stirring up trouble. And he likes to be at the center of attention like a lot of us do. And he wasn’t at the center of this, this attention. So I think, I think those were the kinds of factors that were involved. It was interesting that later, despite the fact that they didn’t have that, Tsongas and Taupier really avoided each other when Taupier was City Manager. He worked with people in the Planning Department, worked with other people, but really tried not to have a lot to do with Bill Taupier. And Taupier was typically sort of polite but uninspired by the Park. But later on when it came, much later on when it came to things like the Arena actually, Paul reached out to Bill Taupier as something who could understand the numbers, help with the negotiations, and make the whole deal work, and also was close enough to people in the business community, major leaders in the business community where he could bring credibility to the table. So, and I heard many times you know, that Bill would really joke about that whole thing, because there was this, he and Tsongas had a reputation for not getting along. But I heard Bill say very positive things about you know, Paul, and Paul’s ability to bring those people together, and to put aside some of those you know, issues and you know, would be vendettas. But I think that’s consistent with Paul’s history. If you look at his whole history, one of the things he was able to do is put unlikely people together and make something happen.

A: Along those lines let’s talk about two unlikely people, Joe Tully and Paul Tsongas.

F: That had to be the most unlikely duo in history, but the thing that I, and I remember saying to Paul, and I might have told you this before, how could you ever support Joe Tully? I mean here’s this just you know, street fighter politician who you know, had this reputation for being you know, really a relentless sort of political infighter. And his constituency was the legislature, and a couple of guys here and there in Dracut. And he was rough and tumble, and he was providing jobs from the community on the counties. And you know, if you were Joe Tully’s pal you could be sure you’d be working at the Billerica House of Correction. That was really his claim to fame in a lot of ways, in
getting things done behind the scenes. And here is Tsongas, who I say did not have the same reputation. In fact I mean they clashed because Paul’s whole reputation and beginning of his career was built at reforming Middlesex County, and it was Joe Tully’s interest not to have it reformed at all. But again the genius of both of those individuals was that they could see the advantages of working together, and they had a huge affection for the city, and that this was a means to the ends. And so I said to Paul, “How could you ever (--)” He came out and he supported Joe Tully for City Manager I said, “How could you ever do that?” You know, “Who are you?”

A: And this is before Joe became a City Manager?

F: Yah, he supported, he supported his candidacy.

A: Who else was running for City Manager at that time? Do you recall?

F: I’m trying to remember. I mean there, I don’t remember specifically, but there were, I don’t know if Bob Gilman was in that at the time, but they were basically candidates who were much, much closer to Paul’s philosophy. (A: Yah) Um, and he said to me two things. He said, “First of all he’s already got five votes, okay” And second of all, “Only Nixon could go to China.”

A: Um, wow. And boy, was he right!

F: So he saw that he was going to be City Manager, and you could be for him or against him, and that he could appeal to the constituency that Paul could never even work with or talk to. And so that alliance basically took you know, the progressive liberal newcomers and put them together with the old political constituency, and it was an incredible force. I mean if you were opposing Tsongas and Tully together, you were out of your mind. (A: Yah, yah) Out of your mind. And so they would you know, Joe was a practical guy in the trenches and Paul was the dreamer, but he wasn’t afraid to get in the trenches either. They would talk every day, and they would get things done. It was incredible because I remember you know, being around and it really was limitless what they could do. Joe was not afraid to you know, use his authority and neither was Paul. And again, thank goodness you know, for the most part everything they did was, the bottom line was it was going to benefit Lowell and it was going to build the business community and make you know, Lowell successful.

A Funny Joe Tully story, political story, while you’ve got a dozen (F: Well I’ve got a million) of them you can give us one.

F: I still like the Mico Kaufman sculpture. Paul Tsongas says to me, “I’m going to do you a big favor and Mico Kaufman’s done a sculpture of the mill girls, and I’m going to let you advance the idea.” “Thanks a lot Paul.” And so I went and see Joe Tully, and there was model at that point that Mico had done. And I mean this really wasn’t that sort of modern. We knew it seemed pretty traditional, but you know I grew up in New York and I’d been to the Metropolitan Museum of Art, and all of that kind of stuff, and studied
a little bit of art history, but this is Lowell, Massachusetts. So Joe looks at this and I remember he turned it around like several different ways, and he says, “What is this?” I said, “That’s a mill girl statue.” And you could tell that you know, this great political mind working its way at this problem. And he said, at that point he had a city council with nine men, and he said, “How in the world,” and he used some definite expletives, “How in the world do you think I’m going to get nine blanken guys to vote for a statue of six broads.” [Both laugh] I didn’t suggest any tactics, because he didn’t need me to suggest tactics. But anyway he says, “Paul really wants this, right?” I said, “Yah.” So we went and got I believe $25,000 from Larry Ansin who was Joan Fabric’s at the time; the Commission pledged $20,000, and the City Council through Community Block Grant money had to come up with $20,000 to get this done. So Joe says, “Go to the Community Block Grant meeting, it’s such and such, and we’ll get the money that way. So I go and we do the slide presentation, we’re showing the Picasso and [Daley Plaza] in Chicago, and this work, and that work. (A: Yah) And you know, compared to that, here’s the model. And you know, this is something that will be great for the city of Lowell and we only need $20,000 to do it. So you know, I got a nine-nothing vote, nine against, none for it. So I go back to Joe Tully and I say, “Joe I don’t know what to do, you know, I failed here.”

A: This was the C, the Community Block Grant?

F: Right.

A: Or was this the City Council?

F: This was the Community Block Grant subcommittee. They voted nine-nothing against it. So we go back to Joe, he goes back to the, he reversed, gets the vote reversed. He goes to the City Council. “Do you want me to do anything Joe?” “No, don’t do anything.” [Both laugh] He says, “Come to the meeting.” I go to the meeting. Joe has a display out. They’re all criticizing it. Joe Tully says, “I’ve been working with Paul Tsongas for the last several years. As you know he got the National Park Legislation. It’s going to bring $40 million dollars to Lowell. He’s never asked me to do anything. This is the one thing he’s asked me to do. I don’t like the way this looks. I don’t even know what it is, but Paul asked me to do this, he’s bringing $40 million dollars, we’ve got to support him.” Nine-nothing in favor, he gets the vote.

A: One more Joe Tully story.

F: I was hiring (--) Oh okay. I was, I had an advertisement for a job supervisor. Joe again, Joe’s reputation for getting people hired did not stop at you know, when he left the legislature. And I was sort of fanatical about you know, hiring the most qualified people and even leaning over backwards not to be looking like the Preservation Commission was an employment agency for everybody friends. So I had this position for the supervisor of construction for the, for the Commission. And we were going to do the Boott Mills’ Boarding House. We had some major projects. And Joe sent a candidate. Just by the fact that Joe sent the candidate I immediately was nervous about that situation, and
questioning this guy’s qualifications. (A: Yah) Funny, the guy it turned out to be is Joe Guthrie, who’s not the Building Commissioner that I have an excellent relationship with, who now reminds me how I didn’t hire him for the job. I didn’t even know who Joe was. So it’s funny. (A: Right) And I have a lot of respect for Joe, but he, but he came from Joe Tully and I said, “Oh my God,” you know, I’m going to look like I’m caving in, and I’m hiring this guy and who is he related to. So what I did was I wiped out the job position, and I ended up being able to hire somebody through the National Park Service. So I didn’t have to say no to Joe, I just said, “We’re not going to have that position anymore.” Well for like the next three Sundays I was ridiculed in the Lowell Sun Sunday column, this rumor about Fred Faust doing this, this rumor about Fred Faust doing this. It was like war had been declared on me and I knew where every story was coming from. It was coming right from Joe Tully’s office. So my little, my little effort to evade going along with what he wanted to do was not particularly successful. I had a couple of situations like that. So after about a month I get a call from Joe. “Hey Freddie, why don’t you come back into the office?” Okay, now he hadn’t even been talking to me for a month. So he said, he says to me, “Did you learn anything from this experience?” He might not have said it that directly. I said, “Well you know, I guess I did.” He said, “All right, you’re back in my good graces now.” But he just wanted to show me that you know, not going along with Joe you were going to pay the price for a while. And I lived through you know, a very miserable month because nobody else knew what the motivation was for Fred Faust being a bum, other than me, Joe Tully, and somebody at the Lowell Sun.

A: Well any final thoughts about National Park, Commission, your time here in the city, etc. Oh I had another question before that. Just, do you remember the day you heard that the Park was going to be authorized?

F: Yup.

A: And how did you hear about that?

F: Well I was there for the vote in the House.

A: And that would have been in the House, and that was the major (--) 

F: That was the major vote, but then the thing about (--) 

A: You weren’t worried about the president vetoing, or anything like that?

F: Well we were a little worried, again, because Senator Brook was involved. You know, we were relatively confident that the rest was going to pass, because Brook did a good job and we were being filled in by what was going on. And again, the onus was sort of on the Senate to find a reason to turn it down, which they didn’t do, or to change it in conference committee. So there were a couple of conference committee. There was consideration of conference committee. We thought it might have to go back to the house. And I think if there were any changes they were extremely minor. But Senator
Brook’s office and Ted Kennedy’s office really did an excellent job. We were pretty sure the votes were going to be there. But I do remember thinking, “Gee, we did so much work in the House and this whole thing could go down in the Senate.” But we had, you know, we had a strong delegation ironically, with, with strong help from Ed Brook. I later got a call back from the woman, his, on the committee who had worked on the legislation.

A: Who was from Brook’s office?

F: Who was from Brook’s office, and was very unhappy about Tsongas running and was sort of maybe appropriately nasty in calling us turncoats, and how could we do this, how could they have helped. You know I remember feeling badly about that. But I think we were already back in Massachusetts getting ready to gear up a campaign. And again, I think I got the call from Paul that the bill had passed in the Senate, and that he was bringing it back. The President was going to sign it. I did not get to go to the White House, but Ashley, his eldest, his oldest daughter was there. And there’s a picture of her on Jimmy Carter’s shoulder. (A: Okay) And Jimmy Carter signed the legislation. Then Paul basically I think that next weekend came back with the legislation of Lowell and it was the parade that I mentioned before. (A: Yah, yah) So you know, when you work with Paul Tsongas you didn’t have much chance for elation. One is he wasn’t a very [salvatory] kind of guy. You know, he’d finish for the day. He go home and be with his family. So actually we, we did go out after the house passed the legislation as I mention to you, like an Italian Restaurant in old town Alexandria, and sort of savor a couple of minutes. But that was a month. You know, that was about all of the savoring that we got to do. And when I wanted to sort of sit back and be exhausted, and enjoy all the work we had done on the Park Legislation, he was already running for the Senate. We were into another exhausting sort of event.

A: Again, any final thoughts about your time here in the city?

F: No. I think just that the type of people in the city, and who have been attracted to the city because of an idea that made sense is just pretty phenomenal to me when I think back. You know you’re involved with something and you can think of a good person or two here and there. And here I can probably think of fifty exceptional people, and all those people coming together with you know, really Pat Mogan’s idea, you know it says something that’s pretty incredible I think about this country, the people in this area, and what the power of a good idea is. It was really a great idea or it wouldn’t have happened this way. But again, it wouldn’t have happened if (--) There were so many people that this wouldn’t have happened if it wasn’t, if it wasn’t you know, for them. So I guess I learned a lot of lessons, and I mean this has been an evolving thing that’s really for me, you know, gone on now for more than twenty-five years. So I just feel very sort of honored to have been involved with that process, and to have had a reason to meet all of these exceptional people. It’s really been, it’s been meaningful to be able to work on something that you can take from an idea to reality, and then you know, take a walk downtown with your kids and see what’s happened. I think that’s fairly unique in life. So I just you know, I just feel lucky to have been part of something like that.
A: Yah. Great. That’s really great! Thanks very much.

F: Good!

Interview ends.