A: And this is interview with Richard Arenberg on May 16th, 2003. And Rich, first a little bit of background information. (R: Sure) Where and when were you born?

R: I was born on October 16th, 1945 (A: Okay) in Norwich, Connecticut.

A: All righty. And where did you go to school at?

R: Well first through the public schools, and graduated from the Norwich Free Academy in Norwich, which is really a private institution, but the city pays tuition. So it’s really the public school.

A: Oh I see. Wow.

R: It’s fairly unique. There are two of them like that [unclear].

A: What? Where’s the other one?

R: Bacon Academy in Colchester.

A: Oh okay. And that’s also in Connecticut.

R: Right.

A: Interesting.
R: And then I went to Boston University.

A: Okay, and what did you take up there?

R: I started as a pre-med student actually. And then worked as a surgical technician in the Boston [unclear].

A: Oh wow!

R: You know, part-time and summers. And sort of got enough (--). I enjoyed the experience, but realized that being a physician wasn’t for me. And I’d always had a taste for politics. And I got involved both in campus politics, and then later on in Boston City, in the mayorality race working with Tom Atkins who at that time was the first black candidate for mayor of Boston.

A: Oh, and what year was this?

R: Gee I (--)

A: Late 60s, early 70s.

R: Yah, yah, it would have been right around there. It was right around, right at you know, 68, 70, somewhere in there.

A: So Kevin White would have been the winner around this time?

R: Right. Yah, it was like a 5-way race as I remember it. And Kevin White and Louise Day Hicks were the, were the big names, and Tom Atkins was way down the list somewhat. He was a Boston City councilor, but significant in that as I say, he was the first black candidate in Boston. And I think he later went on to be the chief council for the NAACP.

A: Oh, oh interesting. So you did that. What other campaigns were you involved? Did you get involved in any presidential politics?


A: Any interesting stories from your campus side?

R: Well I just remember, as a long time opponent of the war in Vietnam, I was always proud of the fact that I walked my first demonstration picket line in Cambridge, in as early as 1960, late 1963 when Madam Nu came go lobby the Kennedy administration from war observers in Vietnam. (A: Aaah!) I remember, I just remember you know, being a young college kid, I think I was in my freshman year you know, and I made this big sign that said, “So this is the new frontier at HU.”
A: [Laughs] Very good. Good for you! And was there twelve people with you, or?

R: Yah, it wasn’t a very large group as you might imagine, but I always felt like (--)

A: I mean that’s, that’s, that’s so early.

R: Out here I always felt like I had, I had, it gave me seniority.

A: [Laughs] [Unclear].

R: I often tell the story. It kind of, it takes me back to my years with Paul and beyond, because you know, when I talk to students who come to visit us here on the hill, and we talk about the role of, of a representative in Congress you know, there’s this debate that’s been around as long as democracy has, about you know, the notion of a delegate verses the notion of a trustee. (A: Hmm) In other words, are you elected to Congress to represent the views of your district, or are you elected to Congress to vote your conscience (A: Hm) and lead your district. (A: Right, right) You know. And you know, I’ve always felt that a, you know, good representative, it’s a mix of those things. It’s a mix of conviction. And on some issues conviction has to hold sway. I mean you, you have to vote your conscience on some issues clearly. On others you ought to be influenced by your constituency. But to bring that home to, to people, I’ve often thought back to my experiences with the war, when in the early years when the war was overwhelmingly popular I can remember thinking about my representatives at the time, well they ought to be principle, they ought to realize that this is, that this war is wrong you know, and they ought to stand up and, and vote their, you know, vote their conscience. They ought to be principled. And then in later years as the, as the 60s were on, and we got into the early 70s and the war became very unpopular, I can remember thinking about those same representatives. We’re the, you know, we’re the majority, it’s clear that the clear majority in this district against the war. They need to follow what their constituency wants them to do.

A: So it’s a mixture and a balance.

R: Yah, that’s right.

A: But I guess it’s probably, and I shouldn’t be talking on the tape because we’re suppose to be listening to you, but (R: Yah sure), but because it’s a conversation I think you know, I guess the core values of the individual representative probably make the decision whether you take the stance in principle or whether you follow your constituents leads.

R: Yah, yah. I think that’s right. I think that’s right. And a good (--) Clearly a good representative is informed by the community he represents. And you know, and grows out of it too. I mean he comes out of it, and I think, I think that’s something that was you know, particularly characteristic of, of Paul Tsongas, you know. I always kidded him
about you know, about being you know, once he, later on when he got to the United States Senate I used to say you know, he was the most powerful city councilor in the country, you know. And it was just my way of needling him about just how much he still fought about, cared about what was going on in Lowell. (A: Yah) And it always informed his decision-making you know. You could see that that experience was very formative in the way he approached issues.

A: Now what did you do after you graduated school?

R: Well I, I went to graduate school.

A: Umhm, in Boston?

R: Still at Boston University. I was a teaching fellow there for a while, and taught political science. (A: Uh huh) And, and, then I, and I also worked for the Elizabeth Peabody House, which was a settlement house in, which actually it grew up in the West End of Boston during, you know, way back around the turn of the century, or I guess I have to say (--) A: Turn of the last century.

R: Yah, turn of the last century.

A: Or the century before.

R: Yah, really. But, and then when the West, the West End of Boston was redeveloped virtually out of existence, (A: Right) the Settlement House moved to Somerville.

A: Oh!

R: And that’s where I worked for them, and I worked as a community organizing in public housing. (A: Oh) And so, and, again there got sort of involved in political environment in Somerville. I was appointed to an adhoc committee on housing by (A: Okay) by the then reform Mayor of Somerville, Lester Ralph.

A: Oh yah!

R: Who later was, just ironically because there’s no, there’s no linkage here, other than just ironically he was one of Paul’s running mates when he ran County Commissioner on a reform ticket.

A: So you didn’t meet Paul through Ralph.

R: No. No. Didn’t know him at that, didn’t know him at the time. (A: Umhm) You know the old joke about that is they had a bumper sticker in that campaign called, it said, “Tsongas, Ralph,” and I think the third guy’s name was Monahan, or Moynihan.
Monahan I think. (A: Okay) So the bumper sticker just had “Tsongas, Ralph, Monahan.” And Paul always used to tell the story that people thought that there was this guy name Ralph Monahan running, and that Tsongas was some kind of weird title, [Both laugh] you know.

A: So you worked with Lester Ralph on this commission?

R: Right, and then I continued, I continued in graduate school. I was, you know, I started to become interested sort of in going to Washington, working on Capitol Hill at around that same time. In fact I went down and applied for a job with, with Ed Muskie, the Senator from Maine, who again I later got to know when I later on worked for Senator Mitchell from Maine who had been a Muskie staffer. But again this was all just coincidental. And but there is a link back to the Tsongas here, because when I was in Washington I went to visit a colleague of mine from my PhD studies at BU who was working for Joe Moakley. (A: Okay) And you know, I went in to talk to her and we were just chatting about different opportunities on the hill, and who was looking for people and everything. Well I don’t know of any jobs in the delegation, but my son who I didn’t know at that time, this was Dennis Cannon, is getting involved in a House race with a young guy from Lowell, Massachusetts. You know he, he probably doesn’t have any chance at all. You know, he’s running against an incumbent congressman, but you know, it might be an interesting thing to do. And anyway, you ought to go talk to Dennis. So I called Dennis and we chatted on the phone. And I, I had been, I had never met him at that point. And it just happened that Paul was going to be in Boston. He was going to the Red Sox game. It was, it was Patriot’s Day you know, where they play the game in the morning. (A: Sure) And he said, “Well you know, Paul will come over.” I had, I had, I hesitate to call it an office. I was a teaching fellow at BU. It was really a converted bathroom. I had taken the toilet out of it, you know, and that was my office, you know. And so he came up there and you know, I’ll never forget my first glimpse of Paul Tsongas. You know, he hadn’t shaved and his shirt tails were hanging out you know, and he was wearing you know, ratty old running shoes, you know. (A: Did he?) And I took a look at this guy and I thought, “Oh man this guy is not going anywhere.” But then I thought, well, you know at the time I was up for a job with Muskie and it was a new position that was opening up on the Senate Public Works Committee. And they sort of told me, “Well you know, we’ll get back to you definitively in the fall,” you know. And I thought well, you know, this might be a fun thing to do for the summer. (A: Umhm) You know, I’ll work on this campaign. You know, probably won’t even win the primary you know, but, and that was the beginning of it all. And you know, I don’t think I was more than a week or two into it when I realized I had totally misjudged this guy, and that he was really a remarkable person. You know, you know at two or three weeks into it I so much believed in him that I called the Muskie people and said you know, “I want to withdraw from consideration for this job, because I’m planning to come to Washington, but with a new congressman from Massachusetts.

A: Really! (R: So) So you really put all of your eggs into Tsongas.
R: Yah, I really kind of put it on the, yah, and you know, never looked back from there. You know really, you know, you know for me personally it’s been sort of a long ride from there. You know, it’s almost thirty years later and I’m still here.

A: Yah. Now tell (--) 

R: In fact after he was elected into the house I told Paul that you know, I’d love to come to Washington with him, but you know, I really only wanted to do that for you know, ten months, maybe a year. And then I wanted to go back to Boston and finish my PhD. And I loved Boston, I always have. And I still talk about moving back up there, but I’m still here.

A: And tell us about that first campaign.

R: Well you know, it was a remarkable thing, because it was you know, it was run on a shoestring really. If you, if you go back you’ll find that we raised in the end about $100,000, which of course today is nothing. At the time we thought it was a lot of money for you know, and we (--) But the truth of the matter is most of that money was raised in the last couple of weeks when it became clear that he really you know, he really might beat this guy, you know. (A: Hm) He was running against Paul Cronin who of course you’ll remember was the incumbent congressman. (A: Umhm) But initially we were really operating on a shoestring, and in fact you know, we had one electric typewriter in the whole campaign, and an old IBM, one of these real old ones with a, like a real cloth ribbon, you know, except we didn’t have a take-up reel for it. So as you typed the ribbon would just kind of like (A: Spill on the floor?) spill onto the floor, right. [Both laugh] And we didn’t even own, we didn’t even own a Xerox machine. So once a day somebody from the campaign would make a trip down Pnomen Copy in, in Cambridge, and do all the zeroxing that was necessarily for the campaign. (A: Wow) It’s mind boggling to think of that now, but, but if you didn’t have your own Xerox machine then, the only operation there really was I think in Lowell was like to go to the library and pay .25c a copy, or a nickel a copy, or whatever it was. It would be ridiculous, you know? And so we you know, we had, the only thing we had was an old fashion mimeograph machine, you know. Mimeograph press releases.

A: There you go.

R: It was, really began on a shoestring. And you know, there’s a, I think of a very funny moment with Paul when I think about that, because we had a visit, we were courting a group in Washington. We were looking for any help we could get. (A: Right) And we were courting a group in Washington called NCEC, which is the National Committee for an Effective Congress. (A: Okay) And it was kind of a liberal democratic leaning group, and tried to, that was trying to elect reform members to the House. And they were very interested in our campaign. And they had some money, but mostly they didn’t contribute to campaigns. What they did is they offered resources you know. They’d do some targeting for you, or some polling or something, you know. We didn’t need any polling because, and I’ll get into this later on, but I, I had a background. One of the
things I did at Boston University was survey research, (A: Okay) public opinion research. And so we built an in-house operation in all the Tsongas campaigns that I put together and operated. And even in the senate campaigns we did our own polling office.

A: Really?

R: Yah. And, but anyway, we were, so what we (--) You know the thing that NCEC ultimately offered to do was to send us a really first class consultant to come up and take a look at our campaign, and give us some advice. And it turned out this was Mark [Shiels], who now is a well-known columnist, and he’s (--) 

A: He’s on the talk shows, right?

R: Right. He’s got, he’s got a Sunday morning talk show, you know, and he’s (--) 

A: Was he on the McLaughlin group?

R: He was for a while, (A: Okay) yes.

A: I think I know what he looks like. He’s a sort of a younger guy in comparison to those guys?

R: Yah, that’s true. Probably you know, he’s, he’s you know, he’s up in his you know, mid 50s, 60s now. (A: Yah) But, and Mark was, and he’s a very funny guy. And he’s an excellent columnist, and a very shrewd political guy. (A: Hm) And he had worked in Ed Muskie’s early campaign, his presidential campaign, and had you know, he had a pretty good reputation nationally in democratic circles, and so they were going to, they were going to send Mark up to give us advice. Well we had two sort of classic Tsongas moments with Mark Shiels. The first one was the first day he arrived he came up to meet Paul and Dennis Cannon, and myself, okay. (A: Yah) And of course you’re familiar with Paul, and I don’t know if you’ve met Dennis, but all three of us really have kind of baby faces, you know, and we were, and we weren’t that old at the time anyway, but you know. (A: Right) And we’re you know, and we you know, if anything (--) And we had just, we had boned up for this thing you know, we were just, we were so intent. In many ways we were more intent at that, in those, in that week leading up to that. We were more intent on not humiliating ourselves in front of Mark Shiels then we were on getting the campaign put together, you know. You know, we wanted his good advice, but we you know, we wanted him to be impressed with us, you know.

A: Right, right.

R: And so you know, we’re, we’re, you know we’re sitting there and kind of, we got all of our act together and our papers, and our issue documents and everything like that. And we sit down, and Mark sits down and he looks at Paul, and he looks at Dennis, and he looks at me, and he looks back at Paul and he says, “Is there any grown-ups in this campaign?” [Laughs] Well we were thoroughly defeated already, deflated already at
that point. So that was the first move. Then the second day, and this is what got me into this story, was the, the campaign headquarters were down on, and I, you know I’ve forgotten name.

A: Is it in, was it in the Rialto building?

R: No, it was in the old, it had been a cleaners.

A: Oh.

R: And not Paul’s father’s cleaners.

A: Okay.

R: But it had been another Lowell cleaners down, (A: Would it be?) just down the hill from where he lived. That street that goes down, that it goes down the hill towards downtown Lowell.

A: Okay. I’m not sure where that was then.

R: Yah

A: Was it near the courthouse?

R: No, no. (A: No?) Going from where Paul lived at that point, which was I think was (A: Highland Street) Highland Street, right, down, you know, you would go down the hill, down towards downtown Lowell. (A: Yup) What’s that street?

A: Gorham Street? Central Street? Thorndike?

R: Yah. Yah. You know I’ve forgotten. It was an old cleaners. (A: Okay) The cleaners was gone, was gone, and we had, we had a bunch of old ratty furniture that in fact had been lying around. It was, that was ironically that was John Kerry’s contribution to our campaign.

A: Oh really?

R: He had some leftover old ratty furniture that was lying in a barn somewhere in a warehouse from his campaign two years earlier. And you know, he lent that to our campaign. So we had some ratty furniture. We had, I’ve already described our office equipment. And we’re in this old cleaners you know, and there was kind of a back room, and that was, that was you know, sort of like Dennis’ headquarters. Dennis was the campaign manager, and I was the issues guy. (A: Yah.) And so they had this office in the back, and on the wall (--) There was a desk and this old ratty swiveled desk chair. And on the wall Dennis had put this chart that was a day-by-day, it was a bar chart, (A: Ummhm) bar graph, and there was a line across that showed, he figured our how much
money had to be raised on an average each day to raise the $100,000 we budgeted for by election day. So that was kind of like you know, a blue line across the upper part of the chart. And then each day there would be a bar that represented how much had been raised, how much had come in that day. (A: Right) Well these little bars were like barely, you could barely even see them, you know. In a good day they might be a little stump of a bar, but nowhere near this line and this average, you know. So this is on the wall right next to the, to the desk you know, which is up, the desk is up against the wall, the chart at an angle. I’m trying to paint a word picture for you. (A: Yah) You know, it’s coming out perpendicular from the wall. And so if you’re sitting in the chair, it’s to, to your right on the wall is this chart.

A: Okay.

R: So we go in there and we’re going to have this, we’re going to have this second meeting with Mark Shiels. And Mark comes, and Dennis and I are sitting there. And Paul sits down in the swivel chair behind the desk, you know. And at some point, well first of all I have to tell you that, that Dennis had taken the chart down because it was so humiliating, you know. He didn’t want this to be there. He didn’t want, he didn’t want Mark Shiels to see it, you know. But at some point in the meeting Mark says to Paul, “So how’s the fundraising going?” And Paul leans back in the swivel chair quickly, and kind of gestures towards the wall where he expects the chart to be. (A: Yah) Well first of all this old ratty swivel chair had a broken back. And he just, when he gestures wildly with his arm he just goes right over backwards. [Both laugh] And meanwhile staring you know, at this blank wall.

A: And Mark Shiels doesn’t know what to do, right?

R: You know, and of course Dennis and I are on the floor, you know, we’re laughing so hard because we knew exactly what happened, you know. It was a combination of the gesture and the surprise at confronting this blank wall, that you know, it lead to Paul’s momentum as he went you know, right over you know, backwards. (A: [laughing], Oh boy) And so Mark is sitting there. Again I’m sure only the good Lord knows what he was thinking, you know. I’m sure it wasn’t, yah, this guy is on his way to Washington.

A: Oh boy. So you were talking about the lack of adults of the grown-ups.

R: Yah, here we were proving, you know, we were proving this to be the case.

A: Did Paul, I mean did he rely on any of the old-timer political people to help out?

R: Well I think you know, in the early days, it was a pretty young campaign. I mean of course he, he had always been somewhat of a maverick in Lowell politics up to that point. I mean he sort of you know, people had kind of laughed at him when he ran for city council, and then when he ran for county commissioner. And you know, he ran on the platform for county commission, that he was going to abolish the county system, you know. (A: Right) And so you know, there was a certain amount of amusement about
this too. I think his, probably the wisest move he made for that ’74 campaign was staying out of the ’72 campaign. You know, when Brad Morse had given up that seat you know, and it was open, I think Kerry when he won that nomination, there were like eight candidates. I mean every democrat who was anybody in, in that Middlesex County area on the 5th District got into that race. (A: Yah) And so they’d all kind of spent themselves in ’72. And Paul, who had seriously thought about getting into that race, had taken the wise step of running for the Middlesex County Commission and winning. And so come ’74 when they’re kind of looking around for somebody to run against you know, now relatively formidable incumbent congressman, you know, there’s, there’s Paul sort of last man standing, you know.

A: Um, um, interesting.

R: So that’s why I say, sort of the first really smart thing he did for the’74 campaign was stay out of the ’72 campaign.

A: Yah, yah. Well I think the reason that Kerry was able to win that nomination is because the city people basically tore each other up, (R: Right) and Kerry was able to win the towns, (R: Right) the more liberal towns (R: Yah) and get the nomination.

R: Yah. Well now in Paul’s case in ’74, he had a pretty good base in Lowell by that point. But he was you know, Lawrence, I mean it seems funny to think of it now, but Lawrence was like alien territory for him, totally. (A: Yah. Yah) It wasn’t even in Middlesex County, so he hadn’t even been the county commissioner there.

A: I see. Yah.

R: And of course it was, you know, it was you know, absolutely fundamental if he was going to be the republican. He had to get big totals coming out of Lowell and Lawrence, you know. (A: Yah) So you know, there you know, we began meeting with people. One of the earliest meetings we had interestingly was with Jim Shannon and his brother.

A: Oh really?

R: And that you know, they were, I think they were very skeptical about us too, but that later became you know, a good friendship. And of course Jim ultimately wound up succeeding Paul in the seat. (A: Right) But ah ("")

A: Well with, with all of these difficulties fundraising and not having you know, the best organization perhaps, what would you attribute Paul’s win to be?

R: Well I just think he was you know, you know his strength in that race was the same thing that he showed in ’78 against Ed Brooke, and then again he showed the country in the presidential race. It was just a genuiness. You know I always said about Paul Tsongas that he was the most candid man that I ever knew. And I’m not just talking about inside of politics, you know. (A: Um. Um) He just, everybody who knew him
recognized that what he said was what he thought, you know, and there was just no guile about him at all, you know. And he was just a very straightforward, principled, honest you know, candid guy. I mean you know, later on as a congressional staffer, he gave me gray hair, because he would say things that just weren’t politic, you know. But you know, the best example of that I can think of in that original campaign was (--) One of the big issues, because remember it was the Watergate year, (A: Right) and so integrity in office was a, was a major issue, you know. (A: Yah) And one of the first things that Paul did was he, as he always did all through his political career after that, was he released all of his income taxes for figures five years, so people could see what his finances were. And he challenged Congressman Cronin to do the same thing, which he refused to do. So we began making an issue out of that you know. Now we were never quite sure, we were never quite sure what he was, whether he was hiding the fact that he was so wealthy, or the fact that people thought he was wealthy and he wasn’t, or exactly you know, what it was, or just you know, that you know a sense of privacy or you know. We were never really quite sure what it was, but it became one of the bigger issues. And a lot of our early leaflets and things like that, we would you know, we had a leaflet that on one side showed a picture of all of Paul’s returns. And the other side of the leaflet was blank. And this is what Paul Tsongas released so that people could see his finances. And this is what Paul [unclear]. So it started a bite you know, and finally we had their first radio, it was just a radio debate, you know, at that point.

A: In Lowell?

R: Actually it was on a, on a Boston radio station. It might have been EEI (A: Umhm) I want to say, but it was on a Boston radio station, and it was sort of our first big real confrontation, you know. And Paul, in that debate, challenged him again to you know, to release his income taxes. (A: Yah) And Cronin was ready for him. And what he came back with was, “Well I’ve, you know, I’ve released my net worth statement, and everybody knows what, you know, what my business is, but you’re a lawyer and you know, people don’t know who your clients are. So I challenge you to release you know, a list of all of your clients and what they’ve paid you,” something along those lines. (A: Umhm) And you know, it was really kind of a deflection of the real issue, which was you know, because I mean the net worth statement didn’t really tell you anything. But you know, Paul who wanted to be as transparent as he could, readily agreed, or actually I think in that first debate it kind of, it kind of through him a little bit. He didn’t quite know what to say. And then we had another radio debate in that same week I think. And the same thing got repeated. And this time Paul was ready. And he said, “Well okay, you know I accept the challenge. We’ll meet on such and such a date in front of the IRS headquarters in Andover. And you’ll release your taxes and I’ll release my, my client list,” you know. So we were all excited about that. And I think it was the next (--) We had said (--) I guess it was tomorrow morning we’ll meet, that’s what it was. So this was a, you know, and this was going to be a big press event and everything. This really generated a lot of interest. Well we went back and of course, and Dennis and I went down to the headquarters to start assembling the client list. And as we’re sitting there we’re looking at each other, and Dennis was an attorney and I wasn’t. And we began to talk about, I don’t know if he raised it, or I raised it, but you know, is there, is there a
client attorney privilege issue here? You know, and then we began to get worried you know, are we going to wind up getting Paul disbarred in the middle of the campaign, or something, you know. And you know, this was already, it was getting to be late the evening before, you know. And so we trudged up to the house on the hill, you know, and I remember we got, we got Paul and Nicki out of bed, you know. They came down. And (--)  

A: Oh, oh, I (--) When you say you, was Paul living on Mansur Street at that time?  

R: That’s right. That’s right. He was on Mansur Street.  

A: Okay. Okay. I thought he was at Highland Street.  

R: No, that’s right, Mansur.  

A: So the cleaners would have been down on the river? Dillon’s? Dillon’s Cleaners?  

R: It might have been.  

A: Was it near the auditorium? No?  

R: Yah ah, yah I think so. You know, I, yah, I’ve just forgotten. I can’t believe that I forget anything from that campaign. It was so etched in my (--) I was living in West Newton at the time, and commuting back and forth every single day. (A: Wow) Campaigns being twenty-hour days, you know. I was like the walking, walking zombie. Anyway that, you know, that particular night I mean Dennis and I trudged up there and we thought we were going, you know, we must have looked like we were going to a funeral. You know, we were, you know, we were just shocked. You know, we just thought, “Oh my God, we’ve really blown it here?” You know. And so we wake Paul and Nicki up and they come down, and you know, Paul kind of just listens to us, and he just kind of, you know, he was just like Paul Tsongas, you know. He, he liked hunched his shoulders and said, “Well you know, I’m committed. I said, I’ll do it. I’ll do it. I got to do what I got to do. And you know, if I get disbarred, so be it,” or whatever, and he goes back to bed, you know. You know, nothing ever worried that guy. You know. And so we go out there the next morning and we’re just ready, you know, and we know Cronin’s not coming. You know. So we got this whole think planned with a table with signs you know, for two chairs. And Tsongas is going to sit here and we’re going to have the Cronin’s sign in a blank seat, you know. And we’re going to have our papers piled up, you know. (A: Right) So, and it was a great picture. So we get there and there’s this gaggle of press like we’d never, you know, we’re a fledgling political campaign. We’d never seen anything like this. I mean everybody was there, you know, and I think there was even Boston media there. (A: Wow) So, and this is the reason for this story. This is classic Paul Tsongas. It says everything about him. He goes across the street. Before he sort of gets what’s effectively on stage, you know, when he first gets there he goes across the street to where all the press people are kind of you know, in a gaggle kind of talking, and chattering and everything. And he, and he goes over and he says, “Look, let
me talk to you for a minute.” He says, “You know, we’ve realized, we want to, you know, we’ve been challenged to release a list of all of my clients and you know, we’ve kind of realized that there might be an issue with whether or not it’s appropriate for me to do that,” you know. And he says, “But I, you know, he said, I made that, I made that promise in good faith and I’m going to follow through on it he said, and I’m going to, I’m going to give you a list of all of my clients, and I’ve marked on the list everyone that I represented in open court.” (A: Umhm) “So my representation of them is a matter of public record.” (A: Right) And if there’s anybody else (--) And so you know, I can give you the details on that. If there’s anybody else on this list that you want to use, and for any reason, in a story or you know, the fact that I represented them, if you know, if you’ll come back to me I promise to approach them and seek their permission to allow it to take place.” Well you know, I’ve never seen anything like that before, or since. It just so disarmed the media that you know, they just, they accepted that and you know, it you know, it, you know there was not story about it, or negative, and they wrote the story straight. (A: Hm) They talked about the people that he had listed. There were a couple of, there were a couple of people that a couple of reporters came back to us and were interested in, mostly just because you know, there was a guy named Edward Kennedy that he had represented, and they were curious whether he represented Ted Kennedy. It was a different Edward Kennedy, you know. (A: Yah) But there were a few things like that, but no negative side to this story. And the positive side was everything that we wanted from it. The fact that Cronin hadn’t come, and that he had kept alive the whole problem that he had with not releasing his taxes. And it went on from there.

A: So Election Day, or night. (R: Right) What happened?

R: Well.

A: What were you doing that day specifically, do you remember?

R: Yah. We you know, the Election Day is, everybody becomes a poll worker. (A: Yup) And you know, you’re out at the polling places holding signs and that sort of thing. You know, you just can’t wait for the day to end. And we were feeling very positive. All of our polls were showing that we had gone ahead and we were now, you know, we were expecting to win the race at that point. And we had, we had a victory party over in, I think it was in Tewksbury, like in the Holiday Inn or something like that. (A: Okay) Kind of a forgettable place, but you know. And there’s a photograph of that night that I know, that I have a copy of it blown up, of Paul you know, giving his victory speech and all the press kind of pressed around him. It’s a prized possession of mine’s. You know it was, it was a great, it was a great night. And you know, and then we, and he was elected! (A: Yah) And we kind of all looked at each other and said, “Oh my God! You know, what do we do now?

A: So when you got to Capital Hill?
R: Yah, oh I remember that first day very well. (A: Uh huh) Paul kind of called us all into his office, you know, and first of all he looks at us and we’re all standing there in suits and ties, you know.

A: For the first time, right?

R: I’d never seen you guys. I’ve never seen you guys with a tie on! [Both laugh] You know, it was pretty funny. Because I remember also that day, he gave an interview you know. It was, I think it was with the Boston Globe. You know it might have been the Lowell Sun, but I think it was the Globe. (A: Yah) Sort of “Mr. Smith goes to Washington” kind of story, you know. And in that story he says, you know, it’s an amazing thing. You know, you almost have to pinch yourself. You sit in your office and you look out the window, and there’s the gold dome. Well you know, he was so newly elected to Congress and so sort of still wet behind the ears, that you know, he you know, of course he was thinking of the gold dome on Beacon Hill. It’s just the Capital Building, you know, there’s no gold on the dome.

A: In D.C, yah, yah. [Both chuckle] Did they put that in the paper?

R: Yah, oh yah! That quote’s around somewhere.

A: Now what was your responsibility during that first term?

R: I was his legislative director. (A: Okay) And you know we started putting together you know, of course with the idea for the Lowell Park really you know, that you know, pre-dated Paul’s election. (A: Sure) And, but it was something he had talked about in the campaign, and something he was intent on doing right from the start.

A: So what was your earliest knowledge of the idea of the Park?

R: I think hearing him talk about it in the campaign. (A: Okay) And then we kind of set to work. We had, you know, we kind of had some, we had very naïve notions about how to get it done when we got to Washington, you know. And you know, but he talked it up at every opportunity, and he got himself appointed to the House Interior Committee, which was the committee of jurisdiction. And my memory was that that was in large part because he wanted to, he wanted to be in a position to get the Lowell Park done.

A: Hm. So (--)

R: I mean ultimately you know, it went on to be he did great things on that committee, and began work on Moe Udall on the Alaska land spill, (A: Right, right) which ultimately became you know, another great accomplishment of his later on when he got into the senate. (A: Right, right) And in fact you know, he played a significant role even in the House before he was, and it was part of his senate campaign, was really the theme of the senate campaign was, if I want, you know, if I want to be your Senator I have to show you what I’ve done as a congressman. (A: Yah) You know, and you know,
Exhibit A I think was the Lowell Park, and even at that point. And Exhibit B was his involvement on Alaska lands, and those things. So, but I say we were naïve about it in that, I mean I think it was a very, I think from the beginning it was a very sophisticated idea, I think. You know, the notion of turning Lowell’s history into you know, a tremendous asset, and the engine of its economic revival. (A: Umhm) And certainly for Paul and I know, for others in Lowell, you know that idea was there and it was I think a very sophisticated, there was nothing naïve about that. But we had just, you know, our approach initially was in Washington, was we thought this was such a shining notion that all we had to do was carry it to the right forum and you know, everyone would fall over with the wisdom of it. You know, and it would, it would be easily done. And ultimately (--) 

Side A ends  
Side B begins.

R: …with the notion of it being an economic development project.

A: Okay. (R: You know) And so you were saying you were naïve.

R: I mean that was, that was, that was the vocabu (--) That was Paul’s vocabulary on it, you know, was at that stage was you know, this is what we’re going to do. You know it’s, it’s wonderful because it, you know this is, Lowell’s history is a tremendous asset, and it’s something you know, we’re going to rediscover it, and highlight it, and use it as the engine of the economic revival of the city. And it will create jobs and it will do all of these things. Well you know, you know, I think we came to learn that this was exactly the wrong thing to be saying (A: Oh really) to people, you know, in the, you know, the National Park Service and on Capitol Hill, about the creation of a National Park. You know, we were the, you know, it was the wrong committee, and the wrong idea, and we kind of had to retool and begin to talk about it more in terms of the you know, the value of (--) You know, first of all selling the notion of you know, selling the notion of a National Park in an urban environment, number one. (A: Um) And number two, you know, emphasizing much more the, the preservation, you know, the values, the history, the educational values, the, the recreational values, the you know, the, the potential interest of people all over the country and coming to Lowell and learning about this important part of our history, and then the roll that manufacturing history had played in American history. You know, the approach turned very much away from the economic development of Lowell, Massachusetts, and much more into something that was a much more traditional view of what a National Park was all about, albeit with a new twist.

A: Now do you remember like some instances where you folks began to see the idea that it didn’t need to necessarily beat the drum of economic development, and?

R: Yah, well I think, you know, I think there were some, some members of the committee who kind of took him aside and said, “Look, you know, you’re going about
And ultimately I think you know, one of the, one of the key stories, and I don’t know whether you know, whether anybody’s told this or even remembers it, but in my mind was a, was really a linchpin along the way to the passage of the Lowell Park legislation, was the leadership fight in the House of Representatives.

A: Okay, tell us about that.

R: And you know, in order to (--) You know, and in thinking about talking to you I meant to go back and get my years straight and everything, because you know, I need to think about what year that was. But (--)

A: But I mean we can find that out in the New York Times. I mean it’s not (R: Right, Right) I mean the story is essentially more important than the (--)

R: There was a five, there was a five-way race for the majority leadership, the democratic majority leadership. (A: Umhm) This is when you know, Tip O’Neil was stepping up to the speakership. Carl Albert was leading the speakership. Tip O’Neil was elected Speaker. And then there was a five-way race (--) Oh it would have had to have been ’76, (A: Okay) because ’78 Carl, Paul was already running for the Senate. And of course ’74 he was just being elected to the House. So it would have had, had to have been right as you know, like the, in preparation for that next congress. And the candidates were Philbert, who of course was a big wheeler, dealer congressman from California. A big, he was a force in the House of Representatives at that point, kind of a reform congressman. Richard Bowling from Missouri, (A: Okay) who was one of, he was, he was a student of the House. He was a very cerebral congressman. He was a senior congressman. He had written a famous book about the House of Representatives called House Out Of Order.

A: Oh really!

R: That, that I had read you know, in Political Science, you know. And I think, I don’t know whether people still read it today, but at least at that time it was a typical thing to read in a, you know, if you were studying American Government. You know, a brilliant guy and a leader in the House, Congressman by the name of [McFall] from, from California, who was the whip. So he was trying to step up to Majority Leader, and Jim Wright (A: From Texas) from Texas, right. And let’s see, was that four?

A: Burton, the guy from Missouri.

R: Right, right. Well maybe it was only four-ways. (A: Okay) Or maybe I’m forgetting somebody, but we don’t (--) If I’m forgetting somebody we don’t need him in the story.

R: There may have been a 5th one. (A: Okay) But the (--) And Paul as, you know, and of course when Paul was elected in ’74 there were I think it was I want to say 74 freshmen democratic congressmen elected. (A: Right) It was a huge class.

A: Class of ’74?

R: It was either (--) Yah, that’s right. But you know, it might have been ’72 of them, or it was something on that order, you know. And it’s funny, just the other day I was looking and I noticed there was only three of them still left in there.

A: Oh yah, that’s interesting.

R: On two of them actually, two democrats and one republican. (A: Really) But ah (--) A: But Richard Arenberg is still around.

R: Yah, but I’m still here. That’s right.

A: Most, most importantly.

R: Yah, and there are a couple of more, there are a couple of more of them that are still over here in the senate. I think, I think Max [Baukas] was in that class. But anyway, so they were a pretty big block you know, the core. And so, and so Paul was, was very much a supporter of Dick Boland, who was you know, a real reformer and had been very solicitous of the freshmen in those first two years, because they represented a, you know, remember when they were first elected to the House the first thing, one of the first things they did was overthrow five chairman of the House. Unheard of. That was a revolution. You know, this is a revolutionary class in the House of Representatives. We tend to forget that now. We take it all for granted, but they were, things were really opening up in the House. And a large part, it was that Watergate class in ’74 that did it.

A: Yah.

R: So they were a real force. And in fact, in fact Paul right away in his first year had been part of a group that had challenged the Speaker. (A: Really?) Yah. And Jim Wright had been sent as the Speaker’s Embassy. He was then the chairman of the House of Public Works Committee to kind of you know, straighten these freshmen out and hold them down, and see what they really wanted, you know, and all of that.

A: Yah. And who was the speaker at that time?

R: Carl Albert from (A: Okay) Oklahoma.

A: Okay.
R: So, so we come to this race with, with Paul being one of the Bowling Lieutenants. He was sort of, he was the one that was sort of moving around the freshmen and trying to drum up support for (--) 

A: Bowling was?

R: For Bowling.

A: Oh Tsongas was doing this for Bowling.

R: Yah, Tsongas was, right. He was. So he was, you know, he was a big Bowling supporter. Now the way these elections, these leadership elections take place in the House is if it’s a kind of a king of the hill voting [unclear] where in each ballot, each succeeding ballot, the person with the, unless somebody has, has a majority in each succeeding ballot the person with the least votes drops out. (A: Umhm) And so, and then, you know, then you have another ballot. And it’s by secret ballot, you know. They ah, and it’s on a slip of paper, and you go up. They, you know, they hold the caucus in the House Chamber. And you go up and you drop it in the, you know, in the box. And they count the votes. Well on the first ballot, let me see if I can remember this correctly now, right off the top of my head. On the first ballot Burton had the most votes I think, and Bowling was second, (A: Okay) kind of a close second. Jim Wright was a reasonably close third. And then I think it was two more candidates, (A: Okay) but it might have just been [unclear]. Anyway they were trailing badly, and fell off. (A: Umhm) But ah, so then there was the subsequent ballot. And you know, Burton was a real wheeler dealer, and I think as history has recorded it, you know, he kind of made a deal with Wright and threw him some of his votes. (A: Um) So that Bowling would go out and then it would be defeated in the next round, because he feared Bowling in the head to head. (A: Umhm) Because you know, they had similar basis, they were both liberals you know. And Bowling you know, might have been more acceptable to them, more conservative. And [Suthing] you know, he was from Missouri and they thought some of the vote from Jim Wright, if Wright went out, would (--) 

A: Would go gravitate towards (--) 

R: Gravitate towards Bowling, (A: Yah) and that Bowling actually would pass him in that final ballot. And so he threw just enough votes to Jim Wright to bring him up into second, because he felt he could beat him. He would get most of the Bowling vote you know. (A: Yah) And so, anyway, and of course that worked and Bowling was out. (A: Yah) So then subsequent to that Phil Burton came over to Paul, who after all had been sort of a Bowling Lieutenant (A: Yah) as he was waiting, actually waiting to ah, he had written out his ballot, he was waiting to put it in, and Burton said, “You know, I know you’re a big Bowling supporter. You know I just, I hope you can be with me on this one.” And you know, Paul being Paul and just out of candor, not any guile really, is the kind of person he was, you know, he had the slip in his hand. Then he opens it up, and you know, he flashes, shows Burton that it says, “Burton,” and puts it in the box. Well Phil Burton, as history as recorded, had miscalculated and Jim Wright had beat him in the
final ballot. (A: Oh really) And probably would never had survived to that final round, beat him and became Majority Leader.

A: Now when Burton had arranged that deal he hadn’t talked to Wright about that deal. He had only told his own people to go vote for Wright in order to boost Wright up?

R: Ah, you know I’m not sure about that. (A: Yah) Yah, I’m not sure which way that worked, but you know in any event it’s pretty much, pretty well established that, that he did that. Now the significance here, and the reason I’m telling you this story in this context, is after he loses that race Phil Burton, you know, gets appointed, I think he was already on the Interior Committee. (A: Okay) He was a relatively senior member of the Interior Committee, but never paid much attention to it, you know. And sort of one of the things he does now that he’s you know, no longer House Leadership, is he, he becomes chairman of the Park sub-committee. And you know, he was just sort of as I say, he was a wheeler-dealer. I mean he just did, you know, he would hold you know, hearings. He would you know, he’d, he was known to you know, pass amendments before they were written, you know. I mean just kind of you know, one of these sort of classic guys with a big cigar you know. He was a great guy, but you know, I mean he was famous for having written one of those you know, when they, they redistricted California. And much as Tom Delay has tried to do in recent days in Texas you know, Burton had put together a redistricting plan in California that gave the democrats, I don’t remember anymore, you know, five or six new seats, you know. So he was a, he was a real factor in democratic politics. And even, he and his brother, his brother was also in the House.

A: Oh interesting. Now let me, let me ah, let me ask you a question (R: Yah) so I don’t misunderstand. So on the third ballot, or the third to last ballot, Paul had actually, even though Bowling was still in the race, he had voted for Burton?

R: Right.

A: Okay.

R: Right. (A: Okay) On that (--) No, Bowling, no after Bowling (--) No, I ‘m sorry. This is, as Bowling, when Bowling was out (--) 

A: Okay, he had voted for Burton.

R: He’d voted for Burton as opposed to voting for Wright. (A: Okay. Okay) And I think what happened is a lot of people got wind of this, of this Burton ploy, (A: Yah) were upset about it, or had, or they figured it out, because Wright who had been third by a considerable amount, shot up to second, you know (A: Yup) in that, in that next ballot. So a lot of those Bowling people who might otherwise have gone to Burton, you know Burton was hypothesizing would go to him, were going, obviously went to Wright, because he won.

R: And so it, you know, it was very significant to Burton that you know, I mean you know, usually they say as goes the secret ballots, you don’t know. Irrespective of what people say to you, you don’t know how they voted. (A: Right) But he knew how Paul Tsongas voted. And I, I don’t know how Paul, I really don’t really know how Paul felt about it, but I always felt that this was a very significant event in the life of the Lowell Park. Because later on Burton, as chairman of the committee, was just, he was just a, you know, a [stall ward], and he just you know, he just moved that thing through that sub-committee. (A: Yah) And Paul had a very good, he had a very close and good relationship with Moe Udall, who was chairman, who was then chairman of the full committee. (A: Okay) And I think Moe was very sympathetic and we worked closely with Moe. I got to know Moe Udall very well as well working on the Alaska Lands Bill. (A: Okay) Which I personally, I was much more, I was much more intimately involved with Alaska than I had been with the Lowell Park. I mean as you know, Fred Faust who was on our staff, had later worked and still is in Lowell I guess. (A: Yes) And Fred did a lot of the real legislative work on the Lowell Park. (A: Yah) But, but you know, you know, and Udall was supportive and it was very straight forward at that point in the full committee, but had it not come through that Park subcommittee in the way that it did, you know, it could, it might never have, have really gotten accomplished, at least not in those first years you know, where he was in the House. I mean you know, maybe later on as a senator he might have you know, he swung a lot of clout and you know, and so it may not have been fatal. (A: Yah) You know, but I tell that story because to me it was a real linchpin moment. And Burton just he, you know, he you know, he held, he held hearings on the Park and just you know, moved it right through. And the day I know we were, you know, Paul was very apprehensive about the mark-up and everything like that. And Burton came in and called the committee to order. Said you know, “We’re going to report the Lowell Park Bill today.” Bang, bang, bang, hit the gavel and out it went. (A: Really) And it was, as I recall it, it was a very short, a very short business meeting and it just got done. It went to the full committee and went on from there.

A: So what were some of the other steps along the road in Congress?

R: Well of course you know, it, it had to be reported by the full interior committee, and then passed on the House floor. But I think you know, with of course Tip O’Neil was Speaker of the House at that point, and you know, Ted Boland from Springfield, and Sylvio Conte from Western Massachusetts were very senior members. Boland was Chairman of the Appropriations Committee. And Sylvio Conte was the ranking republican. And Joe Moakley was already a relatively senior member of the [rolls] committee. So that Massachusetts had a very well placed delegation to help it along once it really got rolling along. But I think the, you know, the odds, the real accomplishment for Paul was you know, it was just unheard of for a freshman Congressman to get something like that off the ground. Of course by the time it got through the committee he was a sophomore Congressman, second term, but even so. You know, if you look around you know, not just then but today you know, you just don’t see new Congressmen with those kinds of accomplishments on their resume.
A: Yah, in less than 3 ½ years or so.

R: Right. Right. And he just always, I mean you know, people in that area will know. He had a single-mindedness about that. And you know, you know I remember you know, when he first left the senate, you know when he found out he was ill and he left the senate, having a conversation with him in which he said, “You know, I’ve been thinking about going home and running for mayor of Lowell.”

A: Really?

R: Yah.

A: He said that? (R: Yah) Interesting.

R: And I, and ah (--) 

A: And he was serious?

R: Well you know, let me take that back. You know it wasn’t mayor of Lowell. It was, “I’ve been thinking about going back home and running for the school committee.” (A: Oh!) That’s what it was.

A: Oh wow!

R: And I said, “You know, you know Paul, people love you in Lowell, but I think you know, people might gleefully vote against you, you know, if you ran for the wrong position like that.”

A: Yah.

R: Of course you know, I was always underestimating him.

A: Was there any setbacks on the National Park Legislation?

R: Ah, you know, not that I recall. I mean I think, I think once it got rolling, once we realized you know, sort of once we began to get traction and began to understand how it, how it had to be interpreted and explained to make sense to people in the congress, you know, I think at that, you know at that point I remember being worried about the senate. I remember Paul coming over and testifying once we got through the House he had to come over and testify before the senate, I think at that time it was still the Senate Interior Committee. They later became the Senate Energy Committee, and he later served on that Committee. But I think that as I remember it, it might have been Howard Metzenbaum who was later sort of a you know, somebody who was kind of a kindred spirit with Paul in the senate, was kind of skeptical about it. You know, that maybe this was some kind of you know, [unclear]. (A: Yah) And, and I think, you know I think there are probably others who would have a clearer memory of what, of what went on with that. I think, I
think that, that Scoop Jackson who was the Chairman of the Committee at the time, and Senator Abourezk from South Dakota, were both relatively supportive.

A: Okay. I think Ed Brooke, one of his staff people worked on the bill.

R: Right. Yah, that makes sense. I mean Brooke and Kennedy would have had to have supported it so as it could survive.

A: Umhm. Right. Right. Was there any political horse-trading to make the bill get through?

R: Ah, not, not in the sense, you know, not in the sense you mean it. I mean I don’t remember a lot of that. (A: Okay) Yah, no I can’t, you know I, you know, not in the, you know, the log rolling sense of you know, “I’ll support you on this if you support that.” (A: Ah huh) I mean I think that he had by that time built a lot of good will on the House Interior Committee. And on an issue like that you know, the House generally shows a lot of difference to its committees. (A: Okay) You know, even more, even more so than in the senate you know, where every senator is sort of a mini expert on virtually everything. Yah, they have enough cloud in the Senate because of its rules that every Senator gets involved in virtually every issue you know, (A: I see) to a greater/lesser extent. Whereas in the House, particularly you know, aside from the most senior members, they’re pretty well focused on the issues that they have some jurisdiction over by virtue of being on a committee. And one of the things that is part of the culture of the House is you know, I have some sway over certain issues because I’m on certain committees. I want you to show difference you know, to that committee on those issues, and so I show difference to your committee on your issues, you know. (A: Right) So that you know, the important part of the game in getting that bill through the House of Representatives was really within the Interior Committee.

A: Um, one you get it through that (--) 

R: And that’s a formidable, that’s a formidable task, because it’s always been true of that committee, because most of its jurisdiction is public lands. I mean most of the issues that its involved with are western issues. (A: Umhm) And so that if you look at the membership of the, it’s no longer called the House Interior Committee. In the Gingrich years they changed all the names of the House committees, and I sometimes confuse them. But, but that committee, because of its jurisdiction, has always had a real western till you know. And so it’s you know, it’s not the most natural committee to sell an urban park in Lowell, Massachusetts. You know, you got people like, I remember the Congressman from Wyoming, [Tino Roncarlio], you know. And Moe Udall was from Arizona of course, as was Congressman Stieger, who was the ranking Republican. Don Young who’s recently been the chairman of the committee, was Republican from Alaska was on the committee then. So you know, the committee had a very western flavor. And a lot of the things that we spent time on there was, were western issues. (A: Yah) Hard rock mining, and you know, and Paul dived into all of this stuff. (A: He did) Yah. And so you know, that’s not horse-trading in the sense you were asking about, but in the sense
of building relationships and respect on the committee, and being seen you know, not as some sort of flaky you know, left-wing congressman from you know, up there in you know New England.

A: In urban New England.

R: Yah really, you know. And you know, in that sense I think you know, it’s not so much horse-trading, but it was you know, earning his stripes on the Interior Committee. I mean he went, he didn’t you know, as a freshman from Massachusetts you know, he could have not shown up on a lot of issues (A: Yah) and he was very diligent about those things. And he weighed in on everything. And that’s how he got into Alaska in the first place. (A: Right) People always said about him, “You know, why, you know, you’re a congressman from Massachusetts, what’s your you know, “How can you spend so much time on what they do in Alaska?

A  But he was doing it.

R: Yah. Yah, I mean because he came. You know he, I mean he had those core principles, but also he came to really appreciate you know, the national treasure that was there. And you know in many ways he understood that in the way that he understood that Lowell was a treasure, (A: Um) you know.

A: Okay.

R: I mean you know, it’s different one, you know (--) 

A: One environment from the other, but there’s (--) 

R: Yah, that’s right, but there’s, but there’s a link there, and there’s an understanding of how that enriches the human experience.

A: Were you familiar with kind of the local people that were advocating for the Park here, here in the city?

R: Really not so much, you know. I mean I would remember names and that sort of thing, but as I say you know it’s really, on our staff it was really Fred Faust who was doing the nitty-gritty. (A: Ah huh) And you know, as the legislative director I had kind of a supervisory over all interest in what was going on there and I did a lot of the work on the Interior Committee, and had relationships with a lot of that staff and so forth. So I you know, I knew a good deal about Ed and Paul’s thinking about it, but you know, on the local end I just wouldn’t have been that closely involved.

A: Yah, let me just give you a couple of names then, and see if it strikes any memory. Pat Mogan?
R: Yah I do remember Pat Mogan, but I didn’t you know, but again you know, I don’t really have much to contribute.

A: Okay. How about Eldred Field? He was with the Locks and Canals?

R: Yah, no I didn’t know him.

A: Okay. How about support from national constituents?

R: Well you know, I, you know, I remember that the, the National Preservation people were very supportive very early on. And you know, I think we worked a lot at, at building, at you know, if not strong support, at least assuring that a lot of the normal environmental community constituency for public lands and parks, and wildlife refuges and all of that, in assuring that they wouldn’t be hostile to this as somehow you know, deflecting resources that could be otherwise better used, you know. There was the potential for good people who were kindred spirits in many other ways. It was the potential if they, if they weren’t educated on the idea behind the Lowell Park of being kind of somewhat hostile to it. You know, here you’re taking Park dollars that could be spent on you know, Yellowstone or Yosemite, or Glacier you know, Glacier Bay or something, and you want to spend it where?

A: In an industrial old mill town?

R: Yah really! Yah really! Doing, fixing up old mills? You know, isn’t there, can’t you get an EDA Grant or something, you know? So there was, that was all part of you know, dealing with that. You know, and it’s a corollary to what I was saying before about not selling it as a, as an economic development project.

A: Any other national contingents? How about like the unions?

R: Ah, you know I really, I don’t recall off hand.

A: The Teamsters, or anybody like that?

R: Yah, I really don’t recall off hand. You know I can’t, I can’t remember any specific strong union support, (A: Okay) but Fred might remember otherwise.

A: Okay. Now do you remember your reaction when you heard that the Park had finally been authorized?

R: Oh yah. Well we were just, you know, it was a huge moment for Paul. And you know I, you know (--) As you know, being up there the wheels never stop spinning, you know. I mean I think at the time I was probably a little naïve about it. I thought well, now that’s an accomplishment, you know. Now that’s done, what’s next? And you know, he, you know the wheels never stop spinning obviously on that to the day he died really. He just always had another idea, another twist you know, let’s enhance the
cultural assets, you know. He was into the architecture. I mean you know, everybody laughed at him. Of course he was you know, designing the street poll you know, the streetlights.

A: He was?

R: Oh yah! Yah he was doing drawings you know. You know he, he just, there was nothing about the, there was nothing about the Park and really to him you know, it was all a piece with the revitalization of Lowell, and the restoration of Lowell. And you know, he never, he really never stopped thinking about that. And you know, the years when he was in the Senate he was always looking for another angle you know. And then you know, even beyond, even after. Then of course when he went back to Lowell he was even more directly involved still.

A: Right. Right. Did you help him out on his senate race?

R: Oh yah. Yah. I went back to Massachusetts and got involved with him on the senate race. And of course I was involved, deeply involved with him on the decision to run for the senate.

A: Okay. Tell us about that.

R: Well as I had mentioned before, we had an in-house polling operation. (A: Right) And we periodically did polls in the 5th District. And we, and I had, we had done a routine poll for his re-election. You know he was planning to run again in ’78. (A: Umhm) And he had an opponent, a guy whose name I’ve forgotten from, I think he was from Lexington, basically unknown and he was not going to be a threat to Paul Tsongas.

A: Right.

R: From that point Paul was, you know, he was going to be re-elected in the 5th District for as long as he wanted to stay there, overwhelmingly. And so this poll was just, it was kind of like a routine thing. We were doing our benchmark so that you know, we would kind of test out what you know, various issues and what was going on, and so forth and so on. And routinely I used Ed Brooke and just you know, known figures like Ed Brooke and Ted Kennedy and others as kind of, I thought of them as ways you know, to kind of calibrate Paul’s strength in the district. So we would ask a hypothetical question about a senate race. We always did that from, right from the time he was first elected in the House. Not because anybody thought he was going to run against Ed Brooke, the conventional wisdom at the time was that Ed Brooke was you know, overwhelming favorite. (A: Umhm) And in fact you know, they, they didn’t know where they were going to get an opponent for him. And I remember that very week that we were, that we first began thinking about it, there was a big story in the New York Times, and another one in the New Republic, both of them on the theme of why Ed Brooke was the republican the democrat loved to love, you know? Why it was that the unions loved him and all of the, the environmental groups and all of the Democratic constituencies in
Washington loved Ed Brooke because they could support him and then claim to be bipartisan. So there were a couple of you know, him and Jake [Javits], and a couple of other, you know, we don’t have republicans like that in the senate anymore.

A: Olympia Snow.

R: Well not quite, you know. I mean Olympia, she’s you know, she’s a, she’s a real moderate, but we (--) You know, Ed Brooke and Jake Javits, and Max Mathias and people like that, they were really liberal republicans, (A: Yah, yah) and they don’t exist anymore. The closest is [unclear] probably, but even there it’s just not you know. You know he’s really a moderate. Maybe the, you know, Jim Jeffords, but of course you know, he crossed over now. Anyway I’m digressing, but (--) So we weren’t, we weren’t in any way seriously looking at Ed Brooke. (A: Umhm) But we did this poll in the 5th District, and of course the 5th District then, and I don’t know exactly you know, it’s been redistricted a couple of times and I don’t know what exactly the configuration is now, but then we had four southern towns that were on the Route 128 ring. Lexington, Concord, Acton and Boxford. (A: Umhm) Is it, Bedford I mean. Bedford. (A: Boxborough?) No, Bedford is.

A: Bedford, yup.

R: Yah, those are the four (A: Umhm) that are really, they’re really suburban Boston on the 128 ring. And in many ways, at least in those days, they sort of had their back to the rest of the 5th District. It was kind of the way you thought about them. They were different you know. (A: Yah) They weren’t oriented towards Lowell. They were oriented towards Boston. (A: Right) And for, in those days, for republicans to win in Massachusetts, and I think it’s still true today, they’ve got to sweep through that 128. Those towns, many of them are largely republican all the way around the 128 ring. If you can’t carry those towns, the cities are overwhelmingly democratic, and you know, the rest of them, the rest of the state there’s not that much population. (A: Right) So you know, you better, you better do real well on those suburban towns or you’re not going to win as republican. (A: Right) Well we did this kind of straw poll of Paul against Brooke, and what I found in those towns was that, and we had, you know, we had benchmarks, because we had been doing this now for four years, you know, and we just found that the floor was dropping out for Ed Brooke in those towns. You know that when you probed it a little, people just thought that he’d been in Washington for twelve years I guess at that point. And you know, they couldn’t really site anything that he accomplished, and there just wasn’t any real kind of hard support for him. It was extremely soft. And when you ran him head to head against Paul, Paul did extremely well, which wasn’t all, it wasn’t all that surprising. It was our District after, our Congressional District after all, and Paul was overwhelmingly popular there. (A: Right) So you couldn’t make too much out of this (A: Right) except that it was a real show of weakness for Brooke, unexpected weakness, you know, that, that nobody was seeing. So you know, Dennis and Paul, and I and others you know, sat down. We talked about his a little and we decided you know, we didn’t really have the resources to do a statewide poll. ((A: Yah) I mean I had built this organization you know, but it was, it was local
people and we used local phones, and all of that, you know. So we decided that we would just do a poll, we would just test out the Route 128 ring. (A: Ah huh) And not even all of it. I think we sampled it. You know, we took a couple of places like Hingham, very republican places on the South Shore, on the North Shore, you know, kind of around the 128 ring, just to see if what we were experiencing in the 5th District would hold up elsewhere. Now we knew you know, it wasn’t you know, Paul wasn’t going to be beat. He had nobody who knew who he was outside of the 5th District. You know his what we call, visibility when we started the senate campaign, Paul Tsongas’ visibility in the state of Massachusetts was 12%. In other words 88% of the people in Massachusetts didn’t know who he was. So that was his starting point. But anyway basically we did that one, we did that sample around 128, and kind of confirmed that what we were seeing was a real softness in these communities. That in our analysis was the bedrock for, for Ed Brooke.

A: Yah.

R: So we then decided we would do, we would do a statewide poll just to see what you know, it was worth the effort just to see what was going on. Just to think this through. And we found that you know, that in fact we felt that there was a vulnerability there. I mean it was not, we had nobody thought this was a keg [unclear]. It was obviously would have to be, people called it a kamikaze mission you see. But when we sat down to talk about it, and you know, the argument that we made on the, on the pro side for doing it was that this was a widow of opportunity that Paul Tsongas would never have again. Because we were looking at what we thought was a real vulnerability, and one that he was particularly well-positioned to exploit, because you couldn’t, you couldn’t run to Ed Brooke’s right, and you had to be, you had to be you know, clean enough. You know, you had, you had to be kind of, have the kind of the sterling character that if you were going to run against the only elected black member of the United State’s Senate, and someone who was very well respected in Massachusetts. Your motive couldn’t be, you know, they had to be beyond reproach. And, and we thought it was, and the reason it was a unique window of opportunity is we felt, we saw that vulnerability and on the other side of the coin, and that others probably were not seeing it, but that at any time that anybody, if it was widely seen then much more formidable democrats statewide would come into the race.

A: Right. Right.

R: And that we’d never get a shot at them. (A: Right) I mean the people who were already running against him were you know, state reps, there were two state reps I think in the race for the democratic nomination.

A: But nobody real big like (--)  

R: Elaine, Elaine Noble, and Mike Connelly I think, who later was the Secretary of State I think in Massachusetts. (A: Yah) But at that point was a state rep. Well you know, if you think Paul Tsongas was invisible at 12%, these people weren’t even on the chart.
A: But say a Joe Moakley had jumped into the race, or somebody like that?

R: Well what we were worried about, remember the really big (--) 

End of Tape I  

Tape II, side A begins.

R: You know, this was the, this was the first Dukakis administration. (A: Yup) Dukakis was about to run for, he was about to run for re-election. You know, he was kind of I think probably not terribly enthusiastic about Paul running for the senate, because of the notion of you know, two Greek democrats on the ticket running for the, running for governor and the senate probably wasn’t exactly what he wanted. But (--) A: So you guys were really worried about Tip O’Neil, or Tom O’Neil?

R: Tom. (A: Tom) Yah, Tom. I’m sorry. So we were worried about whether he was going to run. So anyway we did this poll, and we sat down, and Paul decided that there were, there were, there were three ducks that had to be lined up if he was going to do this. The first one was that he needed to have the Speaker’s blessing, because he was a member of the Democratic Delegation and you know, he felt that running for the senate as a congressman with the Speaker of the House being you know, in the state he was running in, you know, unless the speaker was committed to thinking it was a good idea, it was a non-starter. The second duck was he wanted to know from the publisher of the Boston Globe, because the Globe is such an 800 pound gorilla in Massachusetts politics, particularly democratic politics, (A: Yah) that not that they would support him. He didn’t, you know, that would have been presumptuous you know. I mean they’d always supported Ed Brooke. He was you know, again the republican that you know, a paper that often endorses democrats love to endorse. (A: Yah) It gave them bipartisan. But he, all he wanted to know was that you know, they wouldn’t blow him out of the water right from the beginning. You know, what he would fear was that people would kind of laugh him off before he could really get up on the stage with Ed Brooke, you know. He didn’t want to be dismissed, you know, as this is ridiculous that anybody should presume to run against Ed Brooke. And the third one was he wanted to know that, that Ted Kennedy would endorse him, because the Kennedy history up until that point, not just Ted, but really Jack Kennedy before him, is they had coexisted with first Henry Cabot Lodge, and then Saltonstall, and then Ed Brooke. It had always been sort of the unspoken, or maybe spoken, I don’t even know, but sort of the unspoken agreement that they didn’t mess in each other’s re-election campaign, you know. Kennedy, the Kennedys stayed out of the others, the race against the republican other seat, and likewise the republican other senator didn’t mess in the Kennedy race. And we were aware of that and we figured that there was no way that Paul was going to beat Ed Brooke if we didn’t at least have some level, you know, some level of support from Ted Kennedy. So those were like the three circuit breakers, the three trip wires. You know, he had a meeting with the Globe and they sort of assured him that you know, that they would take him
seriously and give him a fair shot, you know, all of that. He had a meeting with Ted Kennedy in which Kennedy, he went in and again you know, I think very wisely didn’t ask, he didn’t ask for too much. He just said I just want you know, one joint appearance at a fundraiser (A: Umhm), and one TV spot together, you know, and I won’t ask you for anything beyond that throughout the campaign. And Kennedy agreed. And the third tripwire then was Tip O’Neil. (A: Umhm) And he went (--) So he went to Tip one day. Tip was presiding. He was actually on the floor, and he went up to Tip and said, “I want to talk to you about something.” And they kind of stepped aside and so forth. And he said, “What would you think about my running for the Senate?” And Tip said, “Well you know Tommy’s thinking about running.” And of course Paul just totally deflated, you know. He came back, called us in and said, “Well that’s it. Let’s forget about it,” you know. And, and that was it. We stopped thinking about it. We started going back to preparing for the re-election and so forth and so on. (A: Umhm) And I’ll never forget the day. It was Mother’s Day. It’s amazing how late this was when you think about it. This is Mother’s Day in ’78. You know it’s May. You couldn’t do that [unclear].

A: If this was the election you wouldn’t even had started doing it yet.

R: You know, it’s unbelievable. And on Mother’s Day (--) So Mother’s Day (--) Anyway you know, the discussion with Tip was, was before that. Was I don’t remember exactly when, maybe in April or something like that. (A: Okay) Well Mother’s Day I’m at home in Washington. And Paul’s up in Lowell or something. I get a, I get a phone call. I pick up the phone and it’s Paul. And he said, “Are you sitting down?” I said, “No.” He said, “Sit down.” I said, “Okay, I’m sitting down.” He says, “Tom’s not running.” I said, “I’ll be there tonight.” And that was it!

A: And how did Paul find out about that?

R: Well it was actually a pretty public thing. I think you know, there was sort of a period of a couple of weeks where, where, and it really became kind of a point of ridicule for Tom O’Neil I think, that he sort of went through this public indecision about it, (A: Yah) and even left Massachusetts. I think it was kind of a famous thing he went off. I don’t remember where he went, New York or somewhere to think about it, (A: Oh really) and came back and decided not to run, or whatever. It really you know, it was kind of a turning point in his political career I think in Massachusetts, but, but not you know (--) And so the ironic thing about all of this is that you know, what had, what was still a long way from a decision to go when we were going, you know (--) I mean if Tip had said, “Yah, I’ll support you,” those were only the circuit breakers. (A: Yah) And I think we were only beginning the process of, of Paul thinking it through and deciding if he really wanted to do it. (A: Right) And so that wouldn’t have been necessarily the green light at all. But having gone, and I’ve often thought about this, having gone to the edge of the cliff, looked over it, and been pulled back, sort of thrilled by it and pulled back right when he was you know, about to make that decision. Then when suddenly Tom didn’t run nobody ever questioned again. You know, I didn’t, he didn’t, Dennis didn’t, nobody did. It was like you know, okay, the hurdle is out of the way, you know, and we just went.
A: Now had Paul worked quite a bit with Tom when he was working on the Park? Because Tom was the chairman of the Canal District, Historic Canal District Commission (R: Uh huh) during that you know, ‘75 to ‘78 period.

R: Yah he, yah he must have.

A: But you don’t really recall that?

R: Yah, I mean he, he didn’t, you know they weren’t terribly close or anything. (A: Ummh) I mean they were, but they had a good relationship, (A: Ummh) and I think that you know, they had had a very good relationship actually, you know, and I think that was, that was part of it. It was not just that Tom O’Neil was a big fish in the state now, but that, that Paul considered him a friend and you know, wouldn’t want to run a campaign against him.

A: Right.

R: So that’s why it was, you know, once he thought O’Neil was going to run it was a non-starter, you know, and he just walked away. And then once he decided not to run, then he was in, you know. And he held a press conference at the Parker House in Boston to announce that he was running. (A: Okay) And I remember one of the Boston TV anchor reporters asking him some classic Tsongas you know, he asked him, “Well do you have a blessing of the Democratic Party for this race? You know it’s kind of a kamikaze race. You know you’re giving up a safe seat in Lowell and you’re unknown in the state, and Ed Brooke is you know, this is a kamikaze race, you know. Do you have the blessing of your party?” And Paul just kind of gave him this look like, looked at him like, “Do I need it?” Like the notion had never occurred to him that somehow he needed the party’s blessing. But there was, because there was you know, there was always a very independent streak.

A: Yah. And so you had a lot of work to do from May to November.

R: Oh absolutely, and of course, and then of course you know, it kind of, it was a public, I don’t want to call it a scandal, you know, but you know, there were some difficulties arising out of Ed Brooke’s earlier divorce that led to a series of Boston Globe’s Spotlight Series stories that came out after, I don’t remember precisely when it was, maybe a month after Paul had gotten into the race. And so, and suddenly two additional candidates jumped into the primary. Paul Guzzi, who at that point was another of the big democratic fish in Massachusetts. He was Secretary of State; he had been a reform; he’d been elected on a reform ticket for Secretary of State; he was well-known; he was, he was a tremendous problem for us. He was much better known than Paul. He was politically almost, almost identical. (A: Yah) Very few you know, politically there weren’t many issues between them. You know his name was Paul. He even, he was dark, he even looked a little like Paul, and yet he had an ethnic name, Guzzi, but it was Italian as opposed to Greek, you know. It was like not only was he starting out with, our visibility
was 12%, his was like 91%, and he was extremely popular. Not only was he starting out with a tremendous advantage, but it was hard to see how we were going to get out from under his shadow, because you know, we, you know there wasn’t enough contrast to get much leverage there. (A: Hm) The only advantage that we had was that we had been in the race when it looked like a very difficult uphill race against Ed Brooke, and Guzzi looked somewhat like an opportunist jumping in after these public problems had arisen, and Brooke suddenly looked more vulnerable. So it was, you know, it created this issue of a bit of opportunism. (A: Yah) Now part of what was fueling it on the non-public side of it was that Paul had actually talked to Guzzi before he made his decision to run and Guzzi had told him he’d support him now. And so there was a kind of personal element to this, you know.

A: Yah, and Guzzi probably said, “Yah, I’ll support you, but you won’t win,” right? Thinking in his mind.

R: And you know, I mean ultimately, looking down the road you know, Paul was never anybody to keep a grudge. You know, things just rolled off his back. And you know, in later years Guzzi was an executive with Wang, (A: Oh okay) and worked very, and worked very closely with Paul on things in Lowell.

A: Um, interesting.

R: And they were good friends. And in fact, almost immediately I think after, after Paul was elected to the Senate he helped Guzzi raise money to, he had a debt through the primary campaign, and Paul even helped him pay off that debt.

A: Oh really? No kidding. No kidding.

R: So ah, but at the time it was a, it was a crisis. And another candidate who jumped in was Kathleen Sullivan [Olioto].

A: Oh sure, and she had Lowell connections.

R: Well yah, and she was, at that time, very prominent as the chair of the Boston City Council. So she had a Boston base. You know, her father was prominently the owner of the Patriots at that point. (A: Umhm) And her husband was of course the former mayor of San Francisco. And you know, for Massachusetts’ politics, a hyphenated name like Sullivan-Olioto, you know, Irish Italian in democratic politics, you know, we thought “Oh my god! You know, when it rains it pours” So that was, you know, that was a very interesting primary, and of course all have survived it.

A: And how did Paul rise above these other two candidates do you think?

R: Well the first thing was, you know, a famous television spot. And you know Fred Faust was involved. By this time you know, Fred was doing consulting work, and he came back. A lot of the team that we put together for the senate campaign, for the senate,
were the same people who had bee these kids in the 74, because we hadn’t gotten aged by ’78, but you know, everybody had more experience and more you know. But it really was a ragtag army even in that senate race. We had an in-house polling operation. We you know, imagine a major senate campaign doing its own television spots. (A: Um, really) It’s unheard of. It’s really unheard of. These were, these were all done in you know, in-house, just these guys, Fred Faust and Fred Woods, who had been in your House campaign and were in, you know, back for the senate campaign. (A: Yah) And they put together this famous political ad playing on the name. We’d done it in the House campaign. There was a radio spot. So the idea was there. Because even in the House race you know, particularly for Lawrence, the name was a problem. (A: Sure.) Because even if you got, people didn’t know who he was, but even if they heard it and got to know it, they wouldn’t necessarily recognize it when they saw it on the ballots, you know, or on a bumper sticker, you know, that that was the same guy. So we had done a radio spot with kids doing a kind of spelling bee thing. Well the TV spot that became famous was, I have a copy of it if you’ve never seen it.

A: Oh we’d love to get a copy of that here for the Park.

R: Yah. Well I’ll let you dub it. (A: Sure) It you know, he kind of starts out with that line I told you about, where if you see him in front of, actually in front of construction that was going on in Lowell. Part of the, something that was (--) Work on the Park already. And he’s kind of walking in front of this, one of the mills, or something like that, and he sang you know, “If I want to be your Senator,” you know, “I’m Paul Tsongas.” (A: Umhm) Oh no, it doesn’t start that way, I’m sorry. He says, “I’m Paul Tsongas,” and I’m losing the lead line now. Something like, “People don’t know my name,” (A: Umhm) something like that. And it’s a series of sort of people on the street, just average people. And they’re going you know, horse gas, [A: Laughs] you know, trying all kinds of things. And the last one in the series of about five is this [turubic] kid with a bit grin. And all we were doing was showing them a sign with the name on it, and they were trying to read it, really, genuinely you know. And this kid looks at it and he goes, “Ticket!” Well it just you know, and then, then Paul comes on after that. And then he’s in front of the mill or whatever. And he kind of sang, “Well my name is Paul Tsongas, and if I want,” you know, “If I want you to you know,”(--) “If I want to be your Senator I have to show you what I’ve done in Congress.” Like that, a little tag like that, you know. And we started running it and we knew, well we loved it you know. And once we started running it we knew we had a hit on our hands, because the next morning he was out walking in a parade. I don’t even recall what city we were in, but he was walking one of these parades, and people from the sidelines were shouting “Tickets”, you know. [A: Laughs] In fact, just the last week before the actual primary we went back and, and did a second version in which Paul is saying, “Now some people know my name,” you know. Something like that, and it’s the same people. You know, they go, “Tsongas! Tsongas! Tsongas!” And you get back to the kid and the kid goes, “Tickets!” And Paul comes back on laughing and he says, “Well,” and he shrugged his shoulders and says, “Well four out of five is not bad.”

A: Yah, that’s great. That’s a good (--)
R: You know, that was, I mean I don’t want to say he won the primary on account of that, but it, you know, it was that ad that kind of got the buzz going, people paying attention to him. And then you know, he was who he is, you know, he sold himself you know. Then he won that primary. And then he and Ed Brooke had what really is, and what’s interesting about it is, it’s the last highly competitive senate race in the country. And what was (--)  

A: And why do you say that?  

R: Let me finish. (A: Sure) The last high competitive senate race in the country that was run entirely positively.  

A: I see.  

R: There was never any negative campaigning in that.  

A: Huh.  

R: And in fact his first words on election night after he was elected, you know, he’s on national TV in front of the cameras, the lights, he’d just you know, won a big senate victory and he says, “Those are big shoes I have to fill.” His first words really are a tribute to Ed Brooke. And you know, another moment that I remember in that campaign was the first televised debate. (A: Oh yah) Going into, there was a WBZ in Boston, and we were worried about it. By this point we knew we were in a very competitive race. Our polling was, before anybody else even knew it, we knew we were in a very competitive race. (A: Yah) That we you know, Paul was slightly ahead of Brooke, or slightly behind him, I don’t remember which it was at that point. (A: Yah) I think he was even slightly ahead. But all the momentum was, was for Tsongas. People, as they came to know who he was, they were coming to his side. But Brooke had been in Washington. You know, the senate was still in session, and he came back for this televised debate. And what we were afraid of was we didn’t know, this was a wildcard. We were afraid you know, this is the statesman, the senator you know, would he, would he kind of blow us off the stage? I mean Paul was a congressman, but you know, he was never you know, even as a presidential candidate there was never sort of gravitas about Paul Tsongas, you know. I mean that was his charm in many ways, but we were just worried about the senior senator coming back and just sort of you know, being able to, to you know, his command of issues and everything, just making, just overwhelming Paul and just making it look like we didn’t, you know, we didn’t belong in the same league. So we you know, we just had that fear about it.  

A: Right.  

R: And to pump Paul up we took a bunch of our, of our campaign staff and we lined the halls inside of the studio in BZ, with signs and everything like that. So that even if it was a disaster, even if it was a disaster, when he came out you know, everybody would be
there and cheer him and pump him up, and you know, we’d get, we’d get past that. We want to get (--) If it was going to not work out well we didn’t want it to be the turning point from which we then you know, begin to spiral downward.

A: Right.

R: We wanted it to be, you know, to pump him right back up. So, and it turned out you know, it was a very (--) I think that first debate was a very even debate. You know I think Paul did very well. I think you know, I always felt he won it, but you know, who knows? (A: Right) I wasn’t objective, but, but the moment that I’m coming to describe here is that the studio door opens, and I don’t know where Paul was, but Ed Brooke came out first, you know. (A: Yah) And he walks down this narrow hallway, it’s quiet you know, he walks right down the stair lengths of Tsongas people with hats and [unclear] balloons and everything, all the way to the end of this long hall, you know. People just kind of opening a path for him, and he walks down, you know. He gets to the other end of the hall, and he stops and he turns around, and he just, and he says, “I just want to say you people work for a hell of a man.” And I just thought. You know I always remember that moment, both, it shows kind of the class of both of them.

A: Yah, yah. Yah, interesting. Election night, again.

R: Yah, you know, that was just (--)

A: Where did you guys hang out? (R: Well) Were the headquarters in Boston?

R: Yah, we were in (--) Yah, the headquarters were in the old Statler Building.

A: Okay.

R: Which I think you know, which was then a somewhat, one office building I think was being renovated. And I think the victory party if I recall was probably in the Parker House. I could be wrong about that.

A: Okay

R: But you know, it was a great night, but we were, you know, we were, we were sailing. And I remember (--) And I don’t remember election day, whether I actually went out in the field, but in the, on Election Day on the primary I remember I worked the polls in East Boston. (A: Uhm) And in the senate campaign it was kind of, you know, it’s almost absurd to have your key staff out in the field. I mean if you need them out in the field you know, you just kind of do it mostly because you’re so nervous that you want to go do something constructive. (A: Yah, yah) So it’s more to kind of get through the day than anything else, that you do it. But you know, that was, that was a great night. And the next morning, again classic Tsongas, you know. The next morning we were back at the you know, 5:00 in the morning at the subway stop in Government Center, thanking the voters.
A: Oh really?

R: I was out there with him. I’d never done that, you know, sort of pretending to be an advanced man, you know, grabbing people coming up the escalator and everything, and saying, “Come meet you know, come meet the new Senator, you know?” And he’s thanking people. Sort of classic Tsongas, you know. He’s up 5:00 the next morning he’s out you know, working the crowds, you know, and he doesn’t have another election for six years.

A: Good for him.

R: Yah, really, really.

A: Well um (---)

R: Another thing we did that was very, at that point, unique I think, was because we had this in-house polling operation, we went out in the field in the next day or two and did a post-election poll, to take a look at you know, the issues that worked and the reasons we’d won, and so forth. And you know, there was a lot of the conventional wisdom was that you know, that this sort of Globe Spotlight Series had done Brooke in, you know. And in fact we were really able to document that, that that element of it was kind of a wash. That he got as much of a boost out of sort of by that point the sympathy support. (A: Oh) You know, that he’d been sort of set upon you know, somewhat by the media and you know, his ex-wife and all of this, that the bump up he got from the sympathy support was almost exactly the same as the drag that it was on his vote. (A: Huh) But both numbers were relatively small. I still have all that data somewhere hidden away, but one of the things that was remarkable about that campaign was as I said, it was entirely positive between the two candidates, number one. And number two, that there were so few issues between them (A: Yah) that they’d vote (---) Because people always asking, “Where do you differ?” They both focused on a handful. I think there were five issues of such specificity that you would laugh if you saw them now, you know. Tsongas was against the new construction of the neutron, construction of the neutron bomb, and Brooke was for it. (A: Yah) You know, Tsongas was opposed to the nuclear aircraft carrier, or something like that, and then Brooke was for it. And then even, and in light of present day politics, it will make you laugh. But a big issue for us, Ed Brooke was out there. He had supported a plan for national heath insurance. (A: Really!) A big issues for us was that he was not a co-sponsor of the Kennedy [Corman] National Health Insurance Plan. That, which was more extensive, you know. (A: And only, and only) and it wasn’t clear enough, you know.

A: And only if we had Brooke’s plan now! [Laughing]

R: Yah, well that’s right. But you know, yah, it’s a riot.

A: The good republican that he was.
R: Yah, that’s right. That’s right. Oh something that no republican would support today.

A: Well signs of the times.

R: And probably no democrat unfortunately.

A: Well any other National Park related stories?

R: Yah I’ve kind of gotten you off on that.

A: No, but that, no I got you onto that and we wanted to preserve, again this interview was to grab a lot of Paul and the National Park essentially.

R: Well that’s you know, you know to me that story really is all about Paul Tsongas. You know he had a vision. I mean I know you know, locally there were, there were others in the you know, that you know, who from whom that vision arose and so forth, but you know, he you know, Paul took that vision onto himself and into his heart, and there was nothing he cared more about, you know, and he got it done, you know. And you know, there was you know there was, you know I went back to Lowell for his funeral. I saw the buses rolling through downtown Lowell with thanking Paul Tsongas on their, you know, on their destination banners, and it just, it brought tears to my eyes to think about how much he cared about Lowell, and about how much that would have meant to him. You know, just those little, you know, the people lined up to go by. It just, you know Lowell was just in his soul, his roots. It was just such an important part of the man, that and his experience in the Peace Corps. He always talked about talked about how his formative years, how important it was, the years he spent in Ethiopia.

A: Yah. Well thanks very much. (R: Okay) I’m going to shut the recording off now.

R: Great.

Interview ends.